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Abstract. Over the medium time horizon, skill upgrading, differentials in sectoral 
technological progress, and migration of labor out of farming activities are some of the 
major structural adjustment factors shaping the evolution of an economy and its 
connected poverty trends. Our main focus is understanding, for the case of Brazil, how a 
trade shock interacts with these structural forces and ascertaining whether it enhances or 
hinders medium-term poverty reduction. In particular, we consider the interactions 
between the migration of labor out of agriculture, a potentially important poverty 
reduction factor, and trade liberalization, which increases the price incentives to stay in 
agriculture. A recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium model simulates Doha 
scenarios and compares them against a Business as Usual scenario. The poverty effects 
are estimated using a microsimulation model that primarily takes into account 
individuals’ labor supply decisions. Our analysis shows that trade liberalization does 
indeed contribute to structural poverty reduction. However, unless increased productivity 
and stronger growth rates are attributed to trade reform, its contribution to medium term 
poverty reduction is rather small. 
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1  Introduction 
The long-term trend of shrinking agriculture employment and expanding employment in 
the secondary or tertiary sectors has been associated with economic development. And, 
since moving out of agriculture and getting a job in the non farm segment normally 
means earning higher incomes, this type of intersectoral migration should also lead to 
lower poverty rates. In recent years, Brazil, as many other developing countries, has 
experienced a significant reduction of its agricultural employment and there is indirect 
evidence that this migration out of agriculture is poverty reducing. Establishing more 
direct evidence is difficult mainly because of lack of data reporting the characteristics of 
migrants at the time of moving, a limitation that affects (sometimes with intractable 
endogeneity issues) a lot of migration models. This paper, relying on a special section of 
the Brazilian household survey that chronicles individuals’ past employment, offers, for 
the case of Brazil, a direct assessment of how much poverty reduction can be attributed to 
these intersectoral labor movements. By estimating a mover-stayer model using Brazilian 
micro data, we can identify the main factors affecting the propensity of moving out of 
agriculture and rank individuals accordingly. The estimations show that individuals that 
are most likely to migrate are found among the poorer, often landless heads of 
households, but also among the better educated, and thus less poor, non-head household 
members. Overall though, we observe, and this is one key finding of the paper, that 
movers experience the highest poverty reduction when compared to both agricultural and 
non-agricultural stayers.  
This confirms that changes in sectoral employment can significantly contribute to poverty 
reduction. Chronic poverty is often linked to the difficulty of finding employment in a 
better paid job in a growing sector. There is mounting evidence of the existence of 
poverty traps characterized by situations where occupational or technology choices are 
discrete, and where choosing a higher return occupation or technology implies large sunk 
or fixed costs (Barrett 2004). Moving out of agriculture, where poverty rates are often 
much higher than in other sectors, is one example of such choices. 
Our intersectoral migration estimations rely on past data, however by embedding the 
mover-stayer model within a more complete income generation microsimulation 
approach we can model occupational dynamics and test (or simulate) some relevant 
hypotheses (scenarios). Our focus is on global trade liberalization. Recent studies show 
that a major effect of global liberalization is to raise prices of agricultural commodities   4
and thus to increase labor demand in agriculture. This in turn raises agricultural wages 
and reduces a major incentive to migrate to non-farm jobs. We then ask whether global 
trade liberalization, by decreasing inter-sectoral migration, would have an adverse impact 
on poverty reduction. By contrast, by reducing the inflows of agricultural workers 
searching for jobs, it may relieve some of the pressure on incomes in the non-agriculture 
sectors, or even have some direct poverty reducing effect through raising agricultural 
incomes (that more than compensates for lower migration flows). For the case of Brazil, 
we find that trade liberalization scenarios can significantly reduce the flow of workers out 
of agriculture but that the net final effect is that more individuals, rather than less as 
initially hypothesized, are able to escape poverty.  
To resolve the ambiguity of the poverty impacts of trade reform we rely on the mentioned 
microsimulation approach and combine it with a recursive dynamic computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model. In a first step, we build a Business as Usual (BaU) scenario 
that ‘replicates’ for a 15 year future period the main economic trends – including changes 
in the skill composition of the population and in the sectoral distribution of employment – 
observed in the recent decade. We then simulate, for the same time horizon, 
counterfactuals involving trade reforms and link key CGE’s aggregate results (on relative 
factor prices and resource movements from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors) to the 
microsimulation model. This is finally used to estimate new counterfactuals income 
distributions and poverty and inequality statistics can be calculated and compared with 
those of the BaU scenario. 
This macro-micro model enables us to analyze the long-term poverty and distributional 
impact of the different growth patterns implied by trade liberalization scenarios versus a 
Bau scenario, but can potentially be used to study other policies as well. Among the 
additional key findings, our approach demonstrates that, at least for high inequality 
countries such as Brazil, anti-poor changes in the distribution can easily dwarf the 
poverty reducing potential of growth and that successful poverty reduction strategies 
need to include re-distribution or precise targeting measures. This confirms what, in 
different contexts, recent research has also shown: growth can differ tremendously in its 
power to reduce poverty both across countries and over time;
1 according to Bourguignon 
(2003) changes in per capita incomes only explain, at least in his large sample of 
countries, 26% of the variance of observed changes in poverty headcounts.  
                                                 
1 See Bourguignon (2004), Ravallion (2001), Ravallion and Datt (1999), World Bank (2001), or 
Kappel, Lay and Steiner (2005).   5
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some background 
information on the Brazilian case and motivates our approach. Section 3 describes the 
macro and micro models. The results of our simulations are reported and commented in 
section 4. The last section summarizes and concludes. 
2  Background and Motivation 
The main objective of this paper is to assess whether trade reform favors the Brazilian 
poor. It is therefore important to know who the poor are, where they live, and especially 
how they earn their living. In addition, it should prove helpful to identify economic trends 
that have been particularly important for the poor. 
Brazil’s per capita income has virtually stagnated for the past 25 years and the very 
unequal distribution of income has remained more or less unchanged. Accordingly, 
poverty in Brazil has been roughly constant over the past 25 years (Bourguignon, 
Ferreira, and Lustig 2005; Verner 2004). In light of the substantial structural changes that 
have occurred in this period, especially increasing urbanization, a massive decline in 
agricultural employment, an important educational expansion and demographic changes, 
this appears “paradoxical”, as Bourguignon et al. (2005) put it. Yet, microsimulation 
exercises by Ferreira and Paes de Barros (2005) show that each of the features of 
structural change affects poverty and inequality, but they tend to cancel out each other.
2 
Notwithstanding its considerable variation across multiple dimensions, poverty in Brazil 
is particularly high in rural areas, small and medium towns and the metropolitan 
peripheries of the North and the Northeast (Ferreira, Lanjouw, and Neri 2001). In 1996, 
the North and the Northeast accounted for 55 percent of the poor and for 34 percent of 
the Brazilian population. At the national level, about 20 percent of the population lived in 
rural areas contributing 35 percent to total poverty.
3 The high poverty rates in rural areas, 
particularly in the Northeast, are related to this region’s predominance of employment in 
agriculture. The Northeast has the highest share of agriculture in employment with 34 
percent in 2001 compared to only 11.5 percent in the Southeast.
4 According to Ferreira, 
                                                 
2 Note that their analysis compares the income distribution of 1976 with the 1996 distribution. For 
detailed results see Ferreira and Paes de Barros (2005). 
3 Poverty is measured by the headcount ratio. The poverty figures in this paragraph are taken from 
Ferreira, Lanjouw, and Neri (2001). 
4 The figures on agricultural employment are own calculations based on the PNAD 1997 and the PNAD 
2001. The PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios) is a regularly conducted representative 
household survey. The sample had a size of about 380 000 individuals in 2001.   6
Lanjouw, and Neri (2001), 20 percent of all households had a household head employed 
in agriculture and these households contributed 34 percent to overall poverty in 1996. 
Changes in poverty, not only its levels, also differ across regions, rural and urban areas, 
and activities. Verner’s (2004) PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios)-
based figures suggest that the poverty headcount in the Northeast declined from almost 
60 percent in 1990 to 42.3 percent in 2001, whereas poverty in Brazil’s most populous 
state São Paulo rose slightly from 8.6 to 9.4 percent during the same period. For urban 
areas, Ferreira and Paes de Barros (2005) show that extreme poverty increased between 
1976 and 1996. According to Paes de Barros (2004) however, the poverty incidence in 
rural areas in general and among households engaged in agricultural activities, in 
particular, declined from levels of about 60 percent to around 50 percent between 1992 
and 2001. 
One important factor for understanding these developments is the structural change in 
Brazilian agriculture in the 1980s and 1990s. In their assessment of the impact of sector-
specific as well as economy-wide reforms on Brazilian agriculture, Helfand and Rezende 
(2004) conclude that agriculture became one of the most dynamic sectors in the Brazilian 
economy. Between 1980 and 1998 real GDP grew by about 40 percent and real 
agricultural output by about 70 percent. In many sub-sectors, yields increased 
significantly and more harvested area was dedicated to exportables, in particular 
soybeans and sugarcane. Agriculture benefited from favorable macroeconomic 
environment and trade reforms that led to less industrial protection and the elimination of 
taxes and quantitative restrictions on agricultural exports. In addition, specific 
agricultural reforms – in particular a reform of agricultural credit and price support 
policies; an agrarian reform program, including a land reform; and, finally, the 
deregulation of domestic markets for agricultural goods – were important drivers of the 
observed agricultural performance.
5  
However, the increase in agricultural productivity was accompanied by a massive lay-off 
of hired labor and by important changes in the size distribution of farms. According to the 
agricultural census from 1996, the number of small farms declined dramatically and 
agricultural employment shrank by 23 percent between 1986 and 1996, although these 
figures should be taken with some caution (Helfand and Rezende 2004). Our analysis 
based on the 1997 and 2001 household surveys (PNAD) suggests that this decline in 
agricultural employment has continued after 1996. In 2001, agriculture accounted for 
20.6 percent of employment in Brazil down from 24.2 percent in 1997. 
                                                 
5 See Helfand and Rezende (2004) and Dias and Amaral (2002) for details.   7
Non-agricultural activities appear to have compensated for the loss in agricultural 
employment in rural areas, but unemployment rates in urban areas with a previously 
important share of agricultural labor have risen in that period (Dias and Amaral 2002). 
Between 1997 and 2001, overall urban unemployment has risen from 9.44 to 10.6 
percent, an increase that may be related to the decline in agricultural employment.
6 
Less agricultural employment opportunities may also be one of the reasons for further 
urbanization in Brazil although it is difficult to establish this link empirically, as we 
explain in more detail later. The rural population declined quite dramatically from 24 
percent in 1991 to 22 percent in 1996 (IBGE 1997) and 16 percent in 2001 (PNAD 
2001). The trends in rural poverty mentioned above suggest that the described 
developments have improved rural livelihoods. Nevertheless, poverty rates in rural areas 
remain well above urban poverty rates. 
Future developments in agriculture are not known with certainty, but it is likely that some 
of the observed trends, in particular the decline in agricultural employment and the 
related, though very small, increase in incomes from agriculture, will continue. These 
future developments form thus the basis for our Business as Usual (BaU) scenario which 
provides an initial ex-ante quantitative analysis of the forthcoming changes in poverty 
and income distribution.  
So far, we have been mainly concerned with the rural poor and the developments in the 
agricultural sector. However, more than two thirds of the Brazilian poor either live in 
urban areas or from income earned in non-agricultural sectors. Our analysis explicitly 
considers how wages and employment in the non-farm sectors, the main income sources 
for the urban poor, are affected by the migration flow out of agriculture and by the 
education upgrading, but other factors are admittedly excluded. In particular, Ferreira and 
Paes de Barros (2005) find the increase in extreme poverty in urban Brazil to be related to 
rising unemployment and informality. Elbers, Lanjouw, Lanjouw and Leite (2004) report 
that the poverty incidence among informal sector employees and the urban self-employed 
is almost as high as among rural self-employed. In addition, educational expansion has 
been identified as a major tool in the fight against urban poverty and, for good reasons, it 
has become a major policy focus of the Brazilian government.
7  
                                                 
6 Data from employment histories in the PNAD reveal that in both 1997 and 2001 about 6 percent of 
those who became unemployed in the last year were employed in agricultural sectors before. Taking into 
account that approx. 20 percent of the workforce are employed in agriculture, this figure is rather low and 
may be taken as a sign that the rise in urban unemployment is not causally linked to the decline in 
agricultural employment. 
7 The Bolsa Escola Program, a means-tested conditional cash transfer program that reaches 6 million 
households in Brazil, is one of the major policy instruments in this regard. See Bourguignon, Ferreira and 
Leite (2002) for an assessment of Bolsa Escola using a microsimulation model.   8
3  The Modeling Framework 
The model consists of a sequentially dynamic CGE model that is linked to a 
microsimulation. The microsimulation takes the changes in factor and goods prices as 
given; hence, there is no feedback between these two parts of the model. We consider this 
framework particularly suited for the questions at hand, as the CGE model captures some 
of the main features of structural change and the relative price changes accompanying 
them. The microsimulation then allows for a detailed empirical assessment of the 
household responses to these changes. One of the major advantages of the 
microsimulation is that its unit of observation is the individual rather than the household, 
thereby offering a much richer representation of distributional dynamics. 
3.1  The Macro Model 
A 1997 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) has been used as the initial benchmark 
equilibrium for the CGE model. This SAM has been assembled from various sources 
incorporating data from the 1997 Input Output table, information from the SAM 
assembled by Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr, and Gurgel (2003), and the 1997 and 2001 
PNAD household surveys. For the purposes of this model the full SAM – which includes 
41 sectors, 41 commodities, 12 factors (skilled and unskilled labor by gender and by farm 
and non-farm occupation, agricultural and non-agricultural capital, land and natural 
resources), an aggregate household account, and other accounts (government, savings and 
investment, and rest of the world)
8 – has been aggregated to a smaller size and it 
comprises the accounts shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: CGE Model accounts 
Model Sectors
1 CerealGrains 7 OilMinerals 13 MachineryEquipment
2 OilSeeds 8 LightManufacturing 14 OtherServices
3 RawSugar 9 AgriIndustriesExp 15 Construction
4 OthCrops 10 WoodProductsPaper 16 TradeCommunication
5 Livestock 11 ChemicalsOilPr 17 PublicServices
6 RawAnimalProducts 12 MetalMineralProducts
Factors of Production
18 Land 20 Capital 22 Non agriculture Unskil. Lab
19 Natural Resources 21 Skilled Labor 23 Agriculture Unskil. Lab
Other Accounts
24 Production Taxes 28 Direct Taxes 31 Investment-Savings
25 Indirect Taxes 29 Households 32 Variation of Stocks
26 Tariffs 30 Government 33 Rest of the World
27 Export Taxes  
 
                                                 
8 See annex for a full list of accounts.   9
The CGE model is based on a standard neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium model 
and the following subsections describe its main features. Given our focus on labor 
markets and dynamic structural trends, more detailed explanations are provided on the 
modeling of factor markets and growth. 
 
Production. Output results from nested CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) 
functions that, at the top level, combine intermediate and value added aggregates. At the 
second level, on the one hand, the intermediate aggregate is obtained combining all 
products in fixed proportions (Leontief structure), and, on the other hand, value added 
results by aggregating the primary factors. At this level, primary factors are a capital-
labor bundle and aggregate land. Lower levels disaggregate capital and labor, and then 
labor into different categories. The full nesting structure is presented in the annex in 
Figure 4. 
 
Income Distribution and Absorption. Labor income and capital revenues are allocated to 
households according to a fixed coefficient distribution matrix derived from the original 
SAM. Notice that one of the main advantages of using the micro-module is to enrich, as 
described above, this rather crude macro distribution mechanism. Private consumption 
demand is obtained through maximization of household specific utility function 
following the Linear Expenditure System (LES). Private savings are a fixed proportion of 
income. Once the total value of private consumption is determined, government and 
investment demands
9 are disaggregated in sectoral demands according to fixed 
coefficient functions.  
 
International Trade. The model assumes imperfect substitution among goods originating 
in different geographical areas.
10 Imports demand results from a CES aggregation 
function of domestic and imported goods. Export supply is symmetrically modeled as a 
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. Producers decide to allocate their 
output to domestic or foreign markets responding to relative prices. The assumptions of 
imperfect substitution and imperfect transformability grant a certain degree of autonomy 
of domestic prices with respect to foreign prices and prevent the model from generating 
corner solutions. This single country Brazilian model has been linked to a global CGE 
model by adding export demand functions so that the increased market access 
                                                 
9 Aggregate investment is set equal to aggregate savings, while aggregate government expenditures are 
exogenously fixed. 
10 See Armington (1969) for details.   10
accompanying multilateral trade liberalization scenarios can be simulated more precisely. 
In particular, for each export k, export demand has been implemented using a constant 
elasticity function, as shown in equation (1). With a finite elasticity, ηk, demand decreases 
as the price of exports, WPEk, increases. The numerator contains an exogenous export 
price competitive index. If the latter increases relative to the domestic export price, 
market share of the domestic exporter would increase. During a trade policy simulation, 
to mimic the quantity and price shocks resulting from the global model, both the 
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No international import supply functions have been added and Brazil is a price taker for 
its imports. The balance of payments equilibrium is determined by the equality of foreign 
savings (which are exogenous) to the value of the current account.  
 
Factor Markets. Two types of labor are distinguished, skilled and unskilled. These 
categories are considered imperfectly substitutable inputs in the production process. 
Moreover, some degree of factor market segmentation is assumed: capital and land are 
perfectly mobile across sectors, natural resources are sector specific, and labor markets 
for the unskilled are segmented between agriculture and non-agriculture, whereas skilled 
workers are fully mobile. 
 
The labor market specification is a key element of our model and an important driver of 
poverty and distributional results. Therefore, its specification calls for some clarification 
and justification. The labor market skill segmentation
11 has become a standard 
assumption in CGE modeling and it is easily justifiable for the case of Brazil. The 
inequalities of its society in terms of educational endowments and, more importantly, 
access to education and on-the-job training, certainly support this assumption even over 
medium-term time horizons. 
The assumption that the market for unskilled labor is further segmented into agricultural 
and non-agricultural activities is more controversial. To test its validity, we check 
whether incomes in agriculture are still below incomes in other sectors once the 
following wage determinants are controlled for: education, experience, gender, racial 
dummies, employment-status variables, such as self-employment, being employed in the 
                                                 
11 See Taubman and Wachter (1986) for a general discussion of labor market segmentation.   11
informal sector, or working only seasonally. Additionally and to take into account price 
differentials across space, geographical variables capturing differences among Brazilian 
regions, and a rural/urban dummy are included in the wage estimation. Taking the largest 
non-agricultural sector in terms of employment, “other services”, as a reference group, a 
regression analysis shows that agricultural individual labor incomes are significantly 
below this reference group.
12 
There can be a number of reasons for observing this income gap between agricultural and 
non-agricultural employment. A first explanation could be that agricultural income, in 
particular from self-employment, is systematically underreported. Yet, the regression 
results suggest that there is no underreporting problem for the self-employed, as for 
example both the dummy for self-employment and the dummy for being a landowner
13 
turn out to be significantly positive. It can be argued at this point that these dummies 
reflect the returns to land, and underreporting may still be present. Even if so, we also do 
not see a reason why there should be systematically more underreporting among the 
wage-employed in agricultural than among those in non-agricultural sectors. 
Another reason for the sectoral income differential may lie in positive externalities 
associated to agricultural employment. Examples of such externalities include food self-
sufficiency or employment opportunities for other family members. Yet, one can also 
easily think of negative externalities of agricultural employment, such as the exposure to 
weather shocks or hard physical work. These externalities are difficult if not impossible 
to quantify. 
If we accept that there is an income differential between agriculture and non-agricultural 
sectors, the question then becomes why individuals do not respond to this differential and 
move to the non-agricultural sector until incomes in both sectors are equalized. A likely 
answer is that there must be barriers to mobility between agricultural and non-agricultural 
employment and that these barriers are relevant for the time period of our analysis. A 
very important factor that may represent a barrier to mobility in the medium run is land 
ownership in the agricultural sector. Smallholders owning their own land and non-
remunerated family members on these farms account for approximately 40 percent of 
agricultural employment in Brazil. There may be important externalities related to land 
ownership, such as economic independency. Some smallholders may not sell the land 
they own because of a bequest motive. Another important barrier is represented by the 
                                                 
12 This is the case for all agricultural sectors except the oil seeds and the sugar cane sector, which 
account for approximately 6 percent of agricultural employment. The regression results are reported in 
appendix 7.3, where it is also possible to note that labor incomes in all non-agricultural sectors, with the 
notable exception of agricultural processing, are significantly higher than in “other services”. 
13 More than 60 percent of the agricultural self-employed work on their own land.   12
specificity of human capital acquired in the agricultural sector. In addition, risk aversion 
may also prevent people from switching from agricultural to non-agricultural activities 
since they will only on average gain more in non-agricultural sectors. The estimations for 
our microsimulation model, commented in more detail, here below lend empirical 
support to some of these hypotheses. In particular, land ownership appears to prevent 
individuals from moving out of the agricultural sector. 
 
The implementation of dual labor markets for unskilled workers approximates the 
standard Harris-Todaro specification where the decision to migrate is a function of the 
expected income in the non agricultural (urban, in the original formulation) segment 
relative to the expected income in the agricultural (rural) segment. The specification 
deviates somewhat from Harris-Todaro. First, relative wages are used as a proxy for 
relative incomes. Second, actual wages determines migration rather than expected wages 
in the absence of unemployment. The basic migration equation has the form given in 
equation (2), where MIGR represents the level of migration between segments. Note that 
the index l indicates the skill level (l = unskilled), the index g represent the segment (g = 

































































The variable AWAGE is the average wage in the respective segments and is given by 
equation (3). The average wage is a weighted average using, as weights, the employment 
levels for all the sectors of each segment and the net-of-tax wage rates, the rates which 
matter to the worker deciding to migrate or not.  
Labor market equilibrium conditions are based on two separate labor markets rather than 
the integrated market of the skilled workers. Equation (4) determines the equilibrium 
wage rate by segment—i.e. agriculture and non-agriculture. It sets the aggregate segment 
labor supply equal to the demand for labor in the same segment, i.e. it determines the 
variable W
e which is now indexed by both segment index as well as labor type.  








l g L L , ,  (4) 
Within each segment, the model allows for inter-sectoral wage differentials, but these are 
exogenous in the standard model. Equation (5) evaluates the relative wages with respect 
to the segment-specific equilibrium wage. 
 




l i l i ∈ = for , , , φ  (5) 
The remaining loose end is the definition of labor supply and this is given by equations 
(6) and (7). It is assumed that labor supply net of migration is given in any given period. 
In the dynamic scenario, labor supply in each segment grows at the same exogenous rate, 
g
L and migration is subtracted from this amount in the agricultural segment, equation (6), 
and is added to labor supply in the non-agricultural segment, equation (7). Equation (8) 
determines the total economy-wide labor supply for each labor type. 
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Model Closures. The equilibrium condition on the balance of payments is combined with 
other closure conditions so that the model can be solved for each period. Firstly consider 
the government budget. Its surplus is fixed and the household income tax schedule shifts 
in order to achieve the predetermined net government position. Secondly, investment 
must equal savings, which originate from households, corporations, government and rest 
of the world. Aggregate investment is set equal to aggregate savings, while aggregate 
government expenditures are exogenously fixed. 
 
Growth equations. Sectoral shifts among agriculture and non-agriculture and human 
capital upgrading are two of the main features that have characterized recent growth 
processes in Brazil, and indeed in most developing nations. To capture these features in a 
transparent and simple dynamic framework, productivity growth calibration is different 
for the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors. Equation (9) defines the growth rate of   14
GDP at market price and equation (10) is a formula expressing a balanced growth, where 
capital to labor ratio in efficiency units is constant. In equation (10) λ
k and λ
l represent 
efficiency shifters for the capital and labor factors, L and K; χ
kl is the capital to labor ratio 
which is equal to the ratio calculated in the initial equilibrium (where the variables are 
indexed with a subscript “0”). 
 
  1 ) 1 ( − + = RGDPMP g RGDPMP
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 (10) 
Equation (11) and (12) determine the growth rates of labor and capital productivity for 
the non-agricultural sectors (subscript nag). The growth rates have two components, a 
uniform factor applied in all sectors to all types of labor and capital, γ
l and γ
k, and a 
sector- and factor-specific factor, χ
l and χ
k. In defining a baseline, the growth rate of 
GDP is exogenous, as well as the capital to labor ratio. In this case, equation (9) is used 
to calibrate the γ
l parameter and equation (10) calculates the common growth rate for 
capital productivity, γ
k. In policy simulations, γ
l and γ
k are given, and equation (9) defines 















kt nag 1 , , , , ) 1 ( − + + = λ χ γ λ  (12) 
Productivity growth in agriculture is treated differently. As already mentioned, in the last 
decade, Brazilian agriculture recorded high productivity growth, and we impose 
exogenous growth rate for productivity in agriculture uniformly across all factors, as 
shown in the following equations. Equation  (13) represents the increase in labor 
productivity in agricultural sectors not subject to the uniform productivity shift factor γ
l. 
Equations (14) through (16) update productivity of capital, land and the sector specific 
factor, respectively. With agricultural productivity assumed to be uniform across all 




γ will be the same for all 
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γ γ γ λ χ λ 1 , ) 1 ( − + = ag ag ag  (16) 
Additional support for a sector specific treatment of productivity where agriculture shows 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates higher than those for manufacturing comes 
from a recent panel study on sectoral productivity growth in OECD and developing 
countries.
14 In this study, depending on the estimation method, the average growth rate 
for agricultural TFP in middle-income developing countries ranges from 1.78 to 2.91 (in 
% per year). 
 
Other elements of simple dynamics include exogenous growth of labor supply, with 
skilled labor growing faster than unskilled labor, and investment driven capital 
accumulation.
15 
Equation (17) determines labor supply growth for the skilled workers (unskilled labor 
supplies are determined in equations (6) and (7)). It simply applies an exogenous 
assumption about the growth of labor supply, g
ls, to the labor supply shift parameter. 
Equation (18) updates population. Equations (19) and (20) are similar growth equations 








l g 1 , ) 1 ( − + = α α  (17) 
  1 ) 1 ( − + = Pop g Pop
Pop  (18) 
  1 ) 1 ( − + = Land g Land







i g 1 , ) 1 ( − + = γ γ  (20) 
                                                 
14   See Martin and Mitra (1999). 
15  Note that public investment, in this version of the model, has no impact on production technology.   16
Capital accumulation is based on the level of investment of the previous period less 
depreciation. Equation (21) represents the motion equation for capital growth, where δ is 
the rate of depreciation and KAP is the capital stock.  
 
  () 1 , 1 1 − − + − = ZIp XF KAP KAP δ  (21) 
Other exogenous variables may require updating for the baseline. An obvious one is 
government expenditure. This is typically assumed to grow at the same rate as GDP: 
 
  ( ) 1 , 1 − + = Gov
y
Gov XF g XF  (22) 
Other variables that have been updated include the various transfer variables, foreign 
savings, exogenous world prices (i.e. the terms of trade), and fiscal policies. 
3.2  The Micro Model 
The micro model is connected to the macro model through changes in the following set 
of endogenous (in the CGE model) link variables: (a) changes in agricultural and non-
agricultural labor income of unskilled labor (2 variables); (b) changes in labor income of 
skilled labor (1 variable); (c) changes in the sectoral (agriculture vs. non-agriculture) 
composition of the unskilled workforce (1 variable). In addition, mimicking human 
capital upgrading, unskilled and skilled labor supplies grow at different rates and this is 
accounted in the micro data through a reweighing procedure. 
The microsimulation does not consist of a series of cross-sections through time, but rather 
of a single cross-section that reflects the cumulative changes in the aforementioned 
exogenous and endogenous variables between 2001 and 2015.   
The core part of the micro model is represented by the inter-sectoral migration equations 
for the unskilled workers and by the earnings equations. The estimation of these 
equations is described in detail in the following subsection. These equations, together 
with the reweighing, are then used to micro-simulate the changes observed in the CGE 
link variables so that the micro data will be consistent through aggregation with the 
macro data. Subsection 3.2.3 explains how this is done in practice. Finally, some 
potential caveats of these methods and data problems are outlined.  
3.2.1 Estimation 
The sectoral mover-stayer model is estimated for unskilled heads and non-heads 
separately. For both heads and non-heads, we observe whether an individual has moved   17
from agriculture into a non-agricultural sector. Our sample hence consists of those 
individuals who are still in agriculture and those who have moved out of agriculture 
within the last year. 
Estimating such a model is only possible because the PNAD contains a special section on 
employment histories. This section allows identifying those who move out of agriculture 
and, very important for our undertaking, the characteristics of the movers at the time of 
moving, eliminating thus a source of endogeneity often present in migration models. For 
all the movers before they moved out of agriculture we know, for example, which type of 
land right they had if they were self-employed. To our knowledge, this information has 
not yet been exploited.  
The estimated model combines the idea of the mover-stayer model from the migration 
literature
16 with the approach to modeling occupational dynamics applied in typical 
income generation microsimulations.
17 In the latter approach, bi- or multinomial choice 
models are estimated on the entire population. In our case, this would imply comparing 
the characteristics of those in agriculture with those in non-agricultural sectors. Instead, 
the mover-stayer model compares the characteristics of only the movers with those of the 
stayers. This appears to be more appropriate in the current setting, as our goal is to 
simulate the transition from agriculture to non-agriculture. 
Let move be a dichotomous variable that assumes a value of 1 if the individual has moved 
out of agriculture in the last year, and 0 if the individual has stayed in agriculture. As 
indicated by equation (23), an individual will move (move = 1) if the utility (U) 
associated to this choice is higher than the utility of staying in agriculture.
18 Otherwise, 
the individual will stay in agriculture (24). 
 
move = 1 if  U (move=1) > 0 (23) 
move = 0 otherwise. (24) 
 
As indicated by equations (25) and (26), the utility of moving depends on a set of 
explanatory variables X and a random error term ε. A linear relationship between utility 
and the explanatory variables is assumed. The subscripts msh and msnh refer to heads and 
                                                 
16 See for example Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980). 
17 See for example Robilliard, Bourguignon, and Robinson (2001) and Bussolo and Lay (2003). 
18 The utility of staying in agriculture is assumed to be 0. This is typical identifying assumption of the 
logit.   18
non-heads, respectively. They also serve to remind us that the parameters and variable 
vectors are from the mover-stayer (ms) model:
19 
 
msh msh msh msh msh X move U ε β α + + = = ) 1 (  (25) 
msnh msnh msnh msnh msnh X move U ε β α + + = = ) 1 (  (26) 
 
where  msh X  includes an educational dummy for more than 10 years of schooling, age, a 
dummy that refers to own-consumption worker, an employment category – to our 
knowledge unique to the PNAD – that describes workers who are not self-employed, do 
not receive any monetary income, and work “for their own consumption”
20, two dummies 
that refer to the type of land right held by the self-employed in agriculture, one referring 
to a situation, in which the landowner agrees with the self-employed occupying the land 
and another to the self-employed owning the land, and a regional dummy for the northern 
region.  
For the non-heads,  msnh X  is a vector including similar variables and some important 
additions. It consists of three educational dummies, experience (age-schooling-6), 
experience squared, a female dummy, a dummy for blacks, and the same employment 
category and land right dummies as before plus a dummy for non-remunerated family 
members or workers. To take into account the role of the family-network in the migration 
decision, the explanatory variables for the non-heads include a dummy for the household 
head being employed in a non-agricultural sector and another dummy for the head being 
a mover out of agriculture. The reference group for the employment-related dummies are 
the wage-employed.  
As we cannot observe the latent utility U, the parameters of the mover-stayer model will 
be estimated by maximum likelihood logit techniques, i.e. we estimate the models 
described by equations (27) and (28), where F denotes the cumulative density function of 
the logistic distribution. 
 
) ( ) | 1 ( Pr msh msh msh msh msh msh msh X F X move ob ε β α + + = =  (27) 
) ( ) | 1 ( Pr msnh msnh msnh msnh msnh msnh msnh X F X move ob ε β α + + = =  (28) 
                                                 
19 We do not use a subscript for indicating individual observations in the exposition of the micromodel 
for illustrative purposes. 
20 See Notas Metodológicas PNAD 2001.   19
 
Mincer wage/profit equations for unskilled labor in agriculture (the subscript uagr) and 
non-agriculture (unagr), and for skilled labor (s) are estimated as follows: 
 
uagr uagr uagr uagr uagr uw X w + + = β α ln  (29) 
unagr unagr unagr unagr unagr uw X w + + = β α ln  (30) 
S S S S S uw X w + + = β α ln  (31) 
 
where the explanatory variables in all three equations include years of education, 
experience, the corresponding squared terms, a female dummy and racial dummies. In 
addition, we include regional dummies that in equations (30) and (31) also differentiate 
between rural and urban areas. In order to capture the labor input of unskilled agricultural 
workers, equation (29) includes two key variables: a dummy for being self-employed and 
the number of non-remunerated family members. The wage/profit equations (29) to (31) 
are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
21 
3.2.2 Estimation  results 
With few exceptions, the explanatory variables of the mover-stayer models and the 
wage/profit equations are significant at the 5 percent level.
22 The detailed regression 
results are reported in the Appendices 7.1 and 7.2; here we just comment on some results 
that we find remarkable and consider of particular importance with regard to the 
simulation exercise. 
The mover-stayer models appear to have some predictive power for the decision to move 
out of agriculture, as indicated, for example, by the Pseudo R
2 of 0.07 for the heads’ and 
0.15 for the non-heads’ mover-stayer model. It should be noted that measures of fit for 
logit models can only provide a rough indication of whether a model is adequate (Long 
and Freese 2001). 
In the mover-stayer model for heads, one educational dummy for 10 or more years of 
schooling, turned out to have a significant positive influence on moving out of 
agriculture. Yet, we find a number of factors that negatively affect the choice of moving, 
                                                 
21 A short note on the potential problem of the selectivity bias in estimating these equations is added in 
the annex. 
22 Standard errors are adjusted for clustering.   20
among which age is the most important one. As we would expect, older individuals are 
less likely to move out of agriculture. The effect of a discrete change in age of some years 
is particularly strong for younger individuals. Working only for own-consumption also 
has quite a strong negative effect on the propensity to move out of agriculture. Many of 
these own-consumption workers are employed in the livestock sector and possibly even 
own livestock. In addition, if household heads own land or if they have an agreement 
with the landowner to occupy the land, they are more likely to stay in agriculture. 
Owning land or other agricultural production factors, such as livestock, hence acts as 
important barrier to intersectoral movements. Finally, household heads from the north are 
more likely to move out of agriculture, an interesting finding one might not necessarily 
expect, as the north is a region with a low share in agricultural employment. 
As described above, the list of explanatory variables for non-heads is longer. The 
strongest determinant of moving out of agriculture is the dummy indicating whether the 
household head is employed in a non-agricultural sector. We can think of either a self-
employed head being able to offer employment to other household members in a non-
agricultural household enterprise or networks of a wage-employed head that facilitate 
finding non-agricultural employment for relatives. In addition, the choice of the 
household head to leave agriculture strongly influences the choice of the non-heads. 
Educational dummies for having finished primary and secondary education have a 
significant positive effect on the probability of moving out of agriculture. This effect is 
strongest for having finished primary education and declines somewhat for higher 
educational levels. The effect of a change in experience is much stronger than the effect 
of the corresponding change in the squared term. As in the case of the heads, the overall 
marginal effect of experience (including the squared term) declines with increasing 
experience. The subset of coefficients for educational dummies, experience, and squared 
experience can be interpreted as reflecting the earnings opportunities of an individual in 
non-agricultural employment. In other words, these five explanatory variables can be 
thought of as a reduced form representation of the wage differential between agricultural 
and non-agricultural activities. Accordingly, the coefficients for education can be seen to 
reflect decreasing returns to education for the movers and the results for experience 
appear to capture both the effect of age being a barrier to move out of agriculture as well 
as the typical seniority effect in earnings, i.e. increasing but marginally decreasing returns 
to experience. In a similar way, the significant and negative coefficients for racial 
dummies can be interpreted either or both as a direct barrier to non-agricultural 
employment and/or an argument in a reduced form wage differential model.   21
Non-remunerated workers are less likely to move out of agriculture. This finding point 
towards the importance of externalities associated to this type of employment, as 
estimation results indicate that the income gains due to an additional household member 
engaged in the household farm are rather moderate (see Appendix 7.2). The coefficients 
of being an own-consumption worker or owning land are of the same sign as in the case 
of the heads and the changes in predicted probabilities due to a change in the dummy of 
equal magnitude. 
In sum, results for the heads emphasize the role of the barriers to moving out of 
agriculture, whereas, the possible gains of such a move are more strongly underlined by 
the estimation of the choice model for the non-heads. Household heads appear to respond 
to intersectoral wage differentials to a lesser degree, thus showing a tendency to be 
“trapped” in agricultural activities, possibly due to factor market imperfections. Their 
decision to stay or move however is of great importance for the choice of other household 
members.  
3.2.3 Simulation 
The microsimulation involves three steps. First, households are reweighted in order to 
reflect the change in the skilled/unskilled labor ratio that results from different growth 
rates of these two types of labor over time. In a second step, unskilled labor moves out of 
agriculture until the new share of unskilled labor in agriculture given by the CGE is 
reproduced. Third, wages/profits are adjusted according to the CGE results taking into 
account the changes in the skill composition of the workforce as well as the sectoral 
movements of unskilled labor from agriculture into non-agricultural sectors. 
The reweighting procedure basically increases the weight of skilled individuals and 
decreases the weight of unskilled individuals to reach a new given ratio of unskilled to 
skilled workers following an efficient information processing rule.
23 Let weight denote 
the old weight (normalized to 1), and nweight the new weight of individual i. As 
Robilliard and Robinson (2001), we estimate the new weights by minimizing the 
Kullback-Leibler cross-entropy measure of the distance between the new and the old 
weights 
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i nweight  (34) 
 
with  u ( s), a dummy variable for unskilled (skilled) individuals i,  lu ( ls), the initial 
unskilled (skilled) labor force, and gu (gs), the cumulative growth rate (between 2001 and 
2015) of the unskilled (skilled) labor force. lu
* (ls
*) hence denotes the target value for the 
number of unskilled (skilled) labor. Equation (33) hence states that the new weights have 
to reflect the new skill composition (the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers) of the 
workforce. Equation (34) is the adding-up normalization constraint. 
Note that this procedure gives new individual weights for just the employed population. 
Yet, for our purposes we need household weights for entire population. So we averaged 
over the new weights in those households where one or more individuals were employed. 
Households without any employed members were assigned the old weight. Note that the 
resulting unskilled-skilled ratio under these “final” new weights is of course not exactly 
equal to the ratio imposed in the cross-entropy reweighting.
24 Since the workforce in 
agriculture is almost entirely unskilled (more than 95 percent), the share of the unskilled 
labor force in agriculture is only slightly lower under the new weights. We use these new 
weights throughout the following parts of the microsimulation. 
The estimation of the sectoral choice logit model and the two wage equations provide the 
basis for the following steps in the simulation. In the second step, we apply the changes 
in the sectoral composition of the workforce from the CGE (from agricultural into non-
agricultural sectors) to the microlevel. In the simulation, those individuals from 
agriculture with the highest propensity to move to non-agricultural sectors are chosen to 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 For details on maximum entropy econometrics see Golan, Judge and Miller (1996). Robilliard and 
Robinson (2001) apply these methods to reweight household survey weights. They also provide a GAMS 
code for solving this type of problems. 
24 We acknowledge that this is an ad-hoc procedure. In principle, it is possible to reweight all 
individuals respecting all necessary constraints. Yet, we consider the value added of this computationally 
quite expensive exercise too low.   23
leave agriculture. This propensity is simulated by calculating the linear prediction of the 
logit model and adding a simulated residual.  
Equations (35) to (39) indicate how we move unskilled individuals out of agriculture. Let 
the index j refer to all unskilled individuals employed in the agricultural sector and i to all 
employed individuals. Note that the share of unskilled agricultural employment may 
change (and actually does, but only slightly) because of the introduction of the new 
weights at this stage and that move* is 0 for all j, as their observed choice is to stay in 
agriculture. Individuals move to non-agricultural sectors, i.e. move* equals 1, if the 
utility associated to the choice to move increases. Equations (38) and (39) illustrate that 
we increase the utility of moving by augmenting the constants  msh α ˆ  and  msnh α ˆ by  msh α Δ  
and  msnh α Δ , respectively, in order to make individuals move.
25 Changes in the choices of 
the heads have an impact on the choices of the non-heads, as the head’s choice enters the 
utility of the non-heads, indicated by 
*
msnh X . The residuals 
1 ˆmsh ε  and 
1 ˆmsnh ε  are simulated 
such that the resulting utility is consistent with the observed outcome in the initial 
situation.

































1 * * ˆ ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( msh msh msh msh msh msh X move U ε β α α + + Δ + = =  (38) 
                                                 
25 Choosing to change the intercept means that we change the propensity to migrate of everybody 
irrespective of their personal characteristics. This ‘neutrality’ may not be correct but it is the simplest 
assumption lacking additional information. 
26 There are also residuals associated to move = 0, which is why the residuals of move =1 have the 
superscript 1.   24
()
1 * * * ˆ ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( msnh msnh msnh msnh msnh msnh X move U ε β α α + + Δ + = =  (39) 
In order to determine both  msh α Δ  and  msnh α Δ  we need another equation. We decided to 

































Equation (40) implies that the ratio of head to non head movers is constant and equal to 
the value observed in the base year. Previous studies micro-simulating similar individual 
choices used the simple rule of imposing equal ‘deltas’ for both the heads and non-heads. 
In our Brazilian case this would imply that the ratio of heads to non-heads movers would 
change dramatically from the observed historical value and decided to opt for the 
different constraint represented by equation (40).  
After the assigning new weights and moving individuals out of agriculture, wages/profits 
need to be adjusted according to the CGE results in the third step of the simulation. We 
illustrate the procedure of adjusting the constants of the wage/profit equations for 
unskilled labor only.
27 Let k=1,…,K be an index for unskilled individuals still employed 
in agriculture (excluding non-remunerated household members), k=K+1,…,M for the 
movers, and, finally, k=M+1,…,L for those unskilled in non-agricultural sectors who 
have been employed there before (again excluding non-remunerated household 
members). We assume that non-remunerated household members earn an own labor 
income once they move out of agriculture. In equations (42) and (44) we calculate the 
target values for average labor income in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors,  uagr w ~  
and  unagr w ~ , respectively, simply by multiplying initial average labor income by the 
growth rates  uagr g  and  unagr g given by the CGE. These target values for the new 
distribution are reached by adjusting the constants in the wage/profit equations, as 
indicated by equations (43) and (45), taking into account the new weights that reflect the 
changed skill composition of the labor force. Note that for agriculture the procedure is 
slightly more complicated, as we also have to take into account that the dummy for 
agricultural self-employment as well as the number of non-remunerated family members 
might change, indicated by 
*
uagr X  in equation (43). 
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The unexplained wage  unagr uw
∧
 for those who enter non-agriculture is calculated by taking 
the unexplained wage from agriculture and multiplying it by the ratio of the standard 
deviations of the residuals in the non-agricultural and agricultural sectors, respectively. 
For non-remunerated household members moving into non-agricultural sectors we 
simulate a residual. 
In addition to labor income, we consider transfer and capital income as reported in the 
PNAD. Transfer income is scaled up or down with the GDP per capita growth rate and 
capital income with the change in the rental rate from the CGE model. The sum of all   26
household members’ individual incomes is divided by the number of household members 
to give the income per capita. We use regional poverty lines taking a R$ 80 per capita 
poverty line (in current 2001 prices) for urban Rio de Janeiro as a basis and adjusting for 
regional price differences following Paes de Barros (2004). The poverty lines are 
reported in appendix 7.4. 
3.2.4 Shortcomings 
The household income generation process is of course much more complex than the 
proposed micro-simulation model suggests. Many structural features of the Brazilian 
labor market, such as a high degree of informality in wage-employment and the important 
role of self-employment, are only accounted for rudimentarily. Additionally, the data 
used to estimate the mover-stayer model may capture long-term transitions from 
agricultural into non-agricultural employment, but also some temporary job shift, for 
example due to seasonality. Doubts have emerged regarding the reliability of the 
information drawn from the PNAD, in particular on rural, informal sector, and capital 
income (World Bank 2003). 
Finally, it may seem natural to assume that the sectoral movements are somehow related 
to geographical migration from rural to urban areas, either within or even between the 
Brazilian regions.
28 Traditionally, migration has acted as an important adjustment 
mechanism in Brazil. Nearly 40 percent of all Brazilians have migrated at one point in 
their lives (Fiess and Verner 2003). However, the data does not allow to link intersectoral 
movements to geographical migration. First, migration-related questions of the PNAD do 
not cover rural-urban migration. The available information is on whether an individual 
has moved between municipalities and/or between federal states. Second, using the 
information on migration in combination with the employment history from the PNAD 
2001 suggests that only a minor share, of about 12 percent of those leaving the 
agriculture, actually migrates to another municipality. Approximately half of these 
migrants move to another federal state. In light of the importance of migration as an 
adjustment mechanism and the fact that the decline in agricultural employment is 
accompanied by a reduction in the rural population of equal magnitude, we think that 
these figures reflect data deficiencies rather than the Brazilian reality. It is quite likely 
that migrants are underrepresented in the PNAD. Therefore, we had to ignore the issue of 
geographical migration here due to the low share of “geographical” migrants among the 
                                                 
28 This would of course add to the list of arguments why the labor market for the unskilled should be 
considered segmented.   27
sectoral movers. Exploring these issues further and extending the model by linking 
structural change to geographical migration could prove a fruitful exercise, particularly in 
the Brazilian context. 
4  Brazil in the Next Decade: How Trade Policy Affects a Business as 
Usual Scenario 
A central question of this paper is assessing the poverty effects of trade policy reforms in 
the long run, when many structural adjustment forces shape the income generation 
process. Our starting point consists of using our CGE model to build a business as usual 
scenario depicting the evolution of the Brazilian economy in the next decade. This 
evolution should not be considered as a statistical forecast, but rather as a consistent 
“projection” of the economy in a future where inter-sectoral productivity growth 
differentials, skill upgrading, and migration of labor out of farming activities play major 
roles. This Business as Usual (BaU) projection is then contrasted with alternative 
scenarios where trade policy reforms are added. The following subsections, describe in 
details the macro and micro results for the BaU and trade scenarios. 
4.1  The Business as Usual Macro Results 
In the BaU scenario, real GDP for Brazil is projected to grow (from 2005 onwards) at the 
fairly sustained yearly rate of 3.3%; this is somewhat optimistic when compared with the 
recent two decades’ (1980-2000) rate of 2%. This GDP growth performance is backed up 
by strong factor productivity growth rates. As explained above, productivity in the 
agriculture sector is factor neutral and its growth rate is exogenously set at 2.9% per 
year
29; in the non-farm sectors, growth of labor productivity is calibrated at 1.02% per 
year and growth of capital productivity at 0.82% per year. 
These differences in productivity growth rates across sectors, combined with faster 
growth of the supply of skilled versus unskilled labor generate significant structural 
adjustments, in line with those observed for the last decade. The changes in the structure 
of labor markets, shown in Table 2, are of particular relevance for poverty and income 
distribution trends. On the supply side, education increases the supply of skilled workers 
which is growing at a 2.0% annual rate versus a yearly 1.6% growth rate for the unskilled 
labor supply. Additionally, through out-migration, the supply of unskilled workers in 
                                                 
29 Note that this value is at the high end of the estimations of TFP growth rates by Martin and Mitra 
(1999), see page 15.    28
agriculture is shrinking. Labor demand is affected by the following three factors: labor 
productivity in agriculture is exogenous and slightly higher than in the rest of the 
economy; income elasticity of private consumption is below one for agricultural 
commodities and above one for other commodities; and, finally, international prices for 
traded agricultural products are decreasing through time. These three factors concur in 
reducing demand for labor in agricultural sectors and are the key drivers for the migration 
towards the non-agricultural segment.  
These trends in the supply and demand for labor are equilibrated by movements in 
relative wages. In the time horizon considered here, real wages of the skilled increase at 
1.3% annually. In non-agricultural sectors, wages for unskilled workers increase by the 
yearly rate of 0.9%, however their upward trend is dumped by migration. Conversely, the 
implied reduction of supply due to out-migration boosts agricultural wages which are 
growing at a 1.7% annual rate.  












Yearly gr constant Millions
Agri 2.9 0.54 0.0 1.7 1.7 -4.0
Non-Agri 1.0 1.05 2.2 0.9 0.5 4.0
Economywide 2.0 1.7 1.3
Unskilled Lab 
Migration as % of:
Employment Wages
Yearly growth rates Yearly %
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
As shown in Table 3 these structural trends result in a significant 5 percent points 
shrinking in the agricultural employment for unskilled combined with a reduction of the 
unskilled wage gap between agriculture and non-agriculture. Notice that the employment 
percent structure of this table is one of the key variables linking the macro and micro 
models. 
Table 3: Employment shares and wage ratios in 2001 and 2015 
2001 2015 2001 2015 2001 2015
Agri 4 3 27 22
Non-Agri 96 97 73 78
Ratio N-Agri/Agri 1.8 1.6
Unskilled Wages Employment %
Skilled Unskilled
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
These 2001-2015 structural trends should not be taken as forecasts of what is going to 
happen to the Brazilian economy; these are just assumed and correspond broadly to what 
has happened to Brazil in the last decade. They serve as a benchmark against which   29
alternative scenarios are compared. These across scenarios comparisons are the real value 
added of the modeling exercise rather than the levels the variables are estimated to be in a 
particular future year.  
The BaU’s GDP and labor markets macro trends are linked to developments at the 
sectoral level (shown in Table 4). Output growth rates are slightly lower for the 
agricultural sectors than for the non-agricultural ones. Agriculture exports, due to falling 
primary commodity international prices, grow at a slightly lower pace than non-
agriculture exports. Additionally, in agricultural sectors, employment of unskilled 
workers is stalled or reduced, whereas demand for skilled workers, whose wages are 
increasing at a contained pace, is increasing. Productivity gains dictate that less workers 
are needed to achieve the same output, and rising wages, in particular for unskilled 
workers, induce producers to substitute (although with a low level of substitution) skilled 
workers for unskilled ones. The rightmost panel of the table shows the relative sizes of 
sectors in terms of employment and the skill intensities of each sector. Services are the 
largest employers of both skilled and unskilled workers but, on average, they use skilled 
labor more intensively. Agriculture employs almost a third of unskilled workers and uses 
this factor quite intensively, whereas manufacturing labor intensities are in-between 
agriculture and services.  
Table 4: BaU’s output and trade sectoral growth rates, and employment intensities  
Output Imports Exports Skilled Unsk. Skilled Unsk. Skilled Unsk.
CerealGrains 3.2 2.5 2.3 0.3 0.1 0 5 2 98
OilSeeds 3.1 2.2 2.4 0.1 -0.1 0 1 6 94
RawSugar 3.2 0.2 0.1 0 1 4 96
OtherCrops 2.9 1.3 2.5 0.0 -0.1 1 12 3 97
Livestock 3.2 1.5 0.3 0.1 2 4 10 90
RawAnimalProducts 3.3 2.5 1.6 0.4 0.3 0 3 1 99
OilMinerals 3.3 3.0 2.9 1.5 1.7 0 0 15 85
LightManufacturing 3.3 0.8 3.7 1.0 1.2 1 2 16 84
AgriIndustriesExp 3.2 0.5 3.4 1.0 1.2 2 3 16 84
WoodProductsPaper 3.3 0.9 3.5 1.0 1.2 2 2 15 85
ChemicalsOilPr 3.3 1.8 2.9 1.1 1.3 2 1 30 70
MetalMineralProducts 3.5 1.8 3.3 1.2 1.4 2 2 17 83
MachineryEquipment 3.6 1.9 3.5 1.4 1.6 3 2 28 72
OtherServices 3.0 2.6 1.7 2.1 2.3 58 30 33 67
Construction 3.2 2.3 2.5 2 8 6 94
TradeCommunication 3.1 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.4 15 18 17 83
PublicServices 3.1 2.7 1.7 2.2 2.4 9 4 41 59
Agri 3.0 1.9 2.4 0.0 4 27 6 96
Non-Agri 3.2 2.0 3.1 2.2 96 73 29 76
Economywide 3.2 2.0 3.1 2.0 100 100 28 76
Labor Demand by sector by skill
Annual average growth rates Employment percentages
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: the mapping of this table sectors and GTAP sectors is shown in appendix 
7.5, see Table 24 and Table 25.   30
4.2  Distributional and Poverty Results for the BaU 
A moderate decrease in poverty between 2001 and 2015 results from micro-simulating 
the identified key structural trends on the Brazilian household data. Considering the full 
sample of all households, the headcount poverty ratio (P0) declines by about 6 percentage 
points (see Table 5). The reduction of the average normalized poverty gap (P1) and the 
poverty severity index (P2) indicates that those who remain poor move closer to the 
poverty line.
30 Inequality changes very little, as indicated by the 0.1 decrease in Gini 
coefficient (or as in the Theil or other inequality indices, not reported). 
These average indices indicate that some progress in reducing aggregate poverty and 
inequality is achieved in a Business as Usual scenario, but these aggregate measures may 
conceal relevant distributional changes at a more disaggregated level. In fact, reaching 
stronger poverty reduction may require specific pro-poor policies which often rely, for 
their successful implementation, on more detailed information about disaggregated 
distributional effects.  
A first obvious way to gather more detailed information is to analyze the poverty and 
inequality impacts separately for the agricultural and non-agricultural households.  













PC income 314.9 1.5 351.9 1.2 148.3 2.3
Gini 58.6 -0.1 57.1 0.6 56.6 -0.7
P0 23.6 -5.6 18.6 -3.1 46.2 -13.8
P1 9.6 -3.0 7.1 -1.6 21.0 -8.0
P2 5.3 -1.8 3.7 -0.9 12.3 -5.2
Population % 100 81.8 3.3 18.2 -3.3







Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: PC income is per capita income in 2001 R$ and the change is given as 
annual growth rate. All levels are in percent and changes in percentage points. 
A household is classified as “agricultural” when its head or at least two of its members 
are employed in agriculture. In 2001, according to this classification, agricultural 
                                                 
30 A short note on the interpretation of the reported poverty measures: The income-gap ratio, i.e. 
average income shortfall (of the poor) divided by the poverty line, can be calculated as P1/P0. This ratio is 
0.4 for all households in our case, i.e. the perfectly targeted cash transfer needed to lift every poor person 
out of poverty is 40 percent of the poverty line times the number of the poor. Thus, 0.4 times the percentage 
point change in P0 (here 2.4) provides a percentage point change benchmark for evaluating the change in 
P1, as this would be the change in P1 that we would observe had the average income of the poor stayed 
constant while the headcount declined.   31
households accounted for 18.2 percent of the Brazilian population, poverty incidence 
among them almost reached 50 percent, and their contribution to total poverty was about 
36 percent (see Table 5). Between 2001 and 2015, the share of agricultural households in 
the population shrinks by 3.3 percentage points following the decline in agricultural 
employment of more than 5 percentage points. Poverty among agricultural households 
falls by more than 13 percentage points, whereas poverty among non-agricultural 
households decreases by only 3.1 percent. Accordingly, the contribution of agricultural 
households to the headcount falls by almost 9 percentage points. 
A more detailed analysis also shows that the lack of progress in aggregate inequality is 
due to the agricultural and non-agricultural groups’ individual inequality indicators 
moving in opposite directions. Among non-agricultural households, inequality rises 
because skilled labor income, a major source of income for these households, grows 
faster than that of unskilled labor. Conversely, inequality among agricultural households 
falls, mainly because richer agricultural households earn a higher share of their income 
from non-agricultural unskilled labor and, in some cases, from skilled labor. 
Another way of analyzing detailed distributional effects is to consider growth incidence 
curves. These curves plot per capita income growth at income percentiles (Ravallion and 
Chen 2003) and are shown in Figure 1 for all households as well as for the agricultural 
and non-agricultural groups.
31 Reflecting the increase in unskilled agricultural wages 
from the CGE model’s results, per capita income growth is much higher for agricultural 
households. In addition, the agricultural growth incidence curve illustrates a strong pro-
poor distributional shift, which reflects both the increase in agricultural labor incomes 
and the gains resulting from moving out of agriculture.  
                                                 
31 The household category, i.e. agricultural or non-agricultural household, is the category the household 
belonged to in the base year 2001.   32
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
These agricultural households specific distribution shifts also explain the pro-poor 
changes in the national distribution, since only minor distributional changes are registered 
in the non-agricultural distribution. However, richer non-agricultural households 
experience somewhat higher gains than poorer households. Non-agricultural poor 
household incomes increase by a meager 1 to 1.5 percent annually. 
These more detailed analyses of the long term evolution of the Brazilian income 
distribution highlight the different roles played by changes in inequality and shifts in the 
growth rates of the average incomes. The following two questions then arise: if the 
current (2001) distribution of income were to remain unchanged, to what extent would 
the additional growth under the BaU scenario contribute to reducing poverty? And what 
is the poverty reducing role of the BaU differential in growth rates for the agriculture and 
non-agriculture segments?  
Answering these questions requires performing two additional micro-simulations as 
follows. The first simulation generates a counterfactual distribution under the assumption 
that all incomes out of all sources grow by 1.5 percent annually. This implies shifting the 
entire income distribution “to the right” leaving its shape unchanged. Individuals do not 
change employment sectors and hence households retain their initial non-agricultural or 
agricultural classification. Results are presented in Table 6 and changes are given as 
percentage share of the BaU change (column I). In addition, we simulated a second   33
counterfactual distribution for agricultural and non-agricultural households separately 
with per capita incomes of the respective household types growing with the BaU rates, 
i.e. by 1.3 percent annually for non-agricultural and 2.4 percent annually for the 
agricultural households (column II). 
Table 6: Poverty and inequality in a distributionally neutral scenario 
2001 level
% of BaU 
change I
% of BaU 
change II 2001 level
% of BaU 
change I
% of BaU 
change II 2001 level
% of BaU 
change I
% of BaU 
change II
PC income 314.9 100.0 100.0 351.9 117.7 98.6 148.3 65.7 102.9
P0 23.6 91.7 102.4 18.6 139.8 133.3 45.9 56.5 90.5
P1 9.6 90.9 97.7 7.1 132.5 119.7 20.8 61.9 93.2
P2 5.3 86.8 97.9 3.7 125.6 114.3 12.1 62.6 93.4
All households Non-agricultural households Agricultural households
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The comparison of the counterfactual simulations of the “completely” distributionally 
neutral (column I) and the “separately” neutral (column II) scenarios shows that the 
growth bias in favor of agricultural households is poverty reducing. Yet, the difference 
between the BaU and the completely neutral scenario does not seem too pronounced. 
This is due to the fact that poverty among non-agricultural households is reduced much 
more than in the BaU, where the income distribution among these households worsens. 
This “slight” worsening of the income distribution hence hampers quite strongly the 
potential of growth to reduce poverty among non-agricultural households. In addition, the 
differences between the two neutral scenarios for non-agricultural households illustrate 
that a 0.2 percentage point difference in annual growth rates for 14 years can make a 
difference in terms of poverty reduction. The last two columns of Table 6 show the 
importance of growth for reducing poverty among agricultural households as well. A 0.9 
point percentage point difference in annual income growth rates for 14 years implies a 
reduction of about 5 percentage points less in the headcount over this time period. In 
contrast to what we see for non-agricultural households, the impact of the pro-poor 
distributional shift for agricultural households observed in the BaU is relatively small. In 
other words, had the income distribution among agricultural households not improved, 
growth would have reduced poverty by only little less. 
 
The poverty reductions recorded in the BaU scenario are due the change in skill 
endowments, the increase in real factor prices, and inter-sectoral movements. A main 
advantage of micro-simulation techniques is their ability to decompose the total effect in 
different partial effects that can be attributed to single causes. A slight complication 
arises because different causes interact. The interaction arises because factor incomes   34
increase at different rates in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. By simulating 
counterfactual distributions, where only one cause at the time, or a combination of two of 
them, are included, it is possible to decompose the total effect into individual or joint 
(interactive) contributions. 










Skill Upgrading Factor Price Change
Sect. Change Interaction
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: The figure displays the contribution of the respective component to the 
total change in P0 and P2, respectively, in percent. The contributions add to 100. Contributions refer to 
reductions in the respective poverty indices. 
Figure 2 displays the results of this decomposition. Factor price changes account for the 
largest share of total poverty reduction. The change in the skill composition of the 
workforce does not contribute much to poverty reduction, whereas the sectoral shifts are 
quite important, in particular for the poorer among the poor, as the higher contribution of 
the sectoral change component with regard to P2 indicates. This implies that households 
with members moving out of the agricultural sector escape poverty. We consider this 
issue in more detail later. The interaction component, which actually is a sum of distinct 
interaction components, hampers poverty reduction. Counterfactual simulations show that 
the interaction between sectoral movements and income changes is the most important 
one. It is negative since people move out of agriculture where their incomes would have 
increased much more than in non-agricultural sectors. 
In sum, the distributional and poverty analysis suggests that the BaU scenario leads to 
relatively little poverty reduction. Agricultural households fare quite well and the poverty 
incidence and intensity among them is reduced quite substantially. Decomposition 
analyses show that sectoral change contributes quite significantly to poverty reduction, 
although income growth is the most important source of poverty reduction. Micro-
accounting exercises underline the importance of growth for poverty reduction, but we   35
also illustrate that slight increases in inequality can considerably reduce the poverty 
reduction potential of growth in the context of a high-inequality country, such as Brazil. 
4.3  Macro results for the full liberalization and the Doha trade policy 
shocks 
The trade shocks simulated in the dynamic CGE model consist of changes in Brazilian 
tariff protection against imports from the rest of the world and of exogenous changes of 
international prices of traded goods and export quantities demanded by foreigners.
32 The 
shocks are assumed to take place progressively through a gradual phasing-in starting in 
2005 and lasting 6 years. Table 7 displays these shocks as percentage changes of the final 
year (2015) between the BaU and the trade reform scenarios. As part of the shock and to 
leave the government fiscal balance unchanged, tariff revenue losses are compensated by 
a lump sum transfer implemented as an increase in the direct taxes paid by households. 
This lump sum additional tax is the least distortionary instrument that can be readily used 
in our model, however, in practice, the Brazilian government may chose other forms of 
compensatory taxes which may alter relative prices and have significant income 
distribution effects.  
                                                 
32 It should be noted that to mimic the global model results for increased demand for Brazilian exports 
and changes in international prices, we introduce a downward sloping export demand function as shown in 
equation (1) above. During a shock, for obvious reasons, we cannot target both prices and quantities and 
the shock is implemented by modifying both the international price index WPEindex (the price shock) and 
the intercept α
e
k  (the quantity shock). Our Brazil (single-country) model will then endogenously determine 
the quantity supplied.   36



















CerealGrains -100 8 2.0 2.1 16 5.9 6.0
OilSeeds -100 6 2.5 2.5 14 4.8 4.9
RawSugar 2 0.9 1.0 14 5.3 5.4
OtherCrops -100 0 0 2 0.9 0.9 13 4.7 4.8
Livestock -100 2 1.0 1.1 25 9.7 9.8
RawAnimalProducts -100 2 0.4 0.4 18 6.6 6.7
OilMinerals -100 0 0 0.1 0.1 2 1.1 1.3
LightManufacturing -100 -6 0 1 1.1 1.2 9 3.8 4.0
AgriIndustriesExp -100 -4 -1 0 0.6 0.6 7 3.0 3.2
WoodProductsPaper -100 -6 -2 0 0.0 0.0 4 1.8 2.0
ChemicalsOilPr -100 -11 -3 -1 -0.1 0.0 3 1.4 1.7
MetalMineralProducts -100 -6 -1 0 0.0 0.0 3 1.6 1.7
MachineryEquipment -100 -7 -2 0 0.0 0.0 2 1.5 1.7
OtherServices 0 0.0 0.0 5 2.0 2.2
Construction 0 0.0 0.0 4 1.7 1.9
TradeCommunication 0 -0.1 -0.1 5 1.9 2.1
PublicServices 0 -0.1 -0.1 5 2.1 2.3
Agri -100 0 0 5 1.5 1.5 14 4.8 4.9
Non-Agri -100 -7 -2 0 0.0 0.1 4 1.9 2.1
Economywide -100 -7 -2 0 0.1 0.1 5 2.2 2.4
Own Tariff 
reductions
Change in export 
prices
Change in import 
prices
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
The full liberalization scenario has the largest impacts: tariffs are completely eliminated 
and Brazil enjoys strong terms of trade gains; the other two shocks, representing two 
possible versions of the Doha negotiation outcomes, generate almost no own 
liberalization and fairly muted global prices effects. In order to fully appreciate their final 
effects, these shocks need to be mapped to the economic structure of Brazil. Table 8 
presents this structure and helps in this regard. For instance, in the full liberalization 
scenario, export oriented sectors – those displaying high shares of export to domestic 
output – such as Oilseeds, Other Crops and the industrial sectors transforming 
agricultural products (AgriIndustriesExp which buys most of its inputs from agriculture) 
record considerable increases of their export prices. Conversely, import competing 
sectors, such as Chemicals and Oil derived products and capital goods, do not face high 
increases in their international prices. These combined export and import price 
movements result in fairly strong terms of trade gains, inducing significant reallocation of 
resources towards export oriented sectors. Additional push for this reallocation comes 
from Brazil’s own liberalization which entails a reduction of the anti-export bias implicit 
in the higher protection rates for manufacturing of the initial tariff structure.   37














CerealGrains 7 1 15 1 0 1
OilSeeds 6 0 8 0 4 29
RawSugar 0 0 0 0 0 0
OtherCrops 9 2 3 4 8 7
L i v e s t o c k 3 0 1100
R a w A n i m a l P r o d u c t s 8 0 1101
OilMinerals 4 7 33 1 7 25
LightManufacturing 17 4 5 5 3 2
AgriIndustriesExp 18 3 3 7 19 11
WoodProductsPaper 9 2 5 3 7 10
ChemicalsOilPr 9 15 10 9 8 3
MetalMineralProducts 12 5 6 5 13 11
MachineryEquipment 19 37 27 8 20 11
OtherServices 0 11 3 23 5 1
Construction 0 0 0 8 0 0
TradeCommunication 0 10 5 13 5 2
PublicServices 0 2 1 11 1 0
Agri 8 4 4 7 12 6
Nagri 11 96 6 93 88 4
Economywide 11 100 6 100 100 4 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
These effects are detailed in Table 9. The complete elimination of tariffs in the full 
liberalization case explains the large increase of imports (measured in volume) which, in 
the final year of this scenario, is 21% above the value in the same year of the BaU. 
Increases in imports of agricultural goods are much weaker: an aggregate 6% increase 
versus the 21% surge of the non-agriculture bundle. The combination of lower initial 
tariffs and stronger international price increases for agriculture, with respect to non-
agriculture, explain the difference in import response of these two aggregate sectors. 
Given their very limited scope of tariff reduction, the Doha scenarios imply much more 
contained changes of imports.  
With high elasticity of substitution in demand, cheaper imports have the potential to 
displace domestic production, especially for those goods whose demand is fulfilled by a 
large share of foreign supply. For Brazil, this is the case for the Chemicals, and Capital 
goods sectors. In the full liberalization scenario, domestic production experiences 
significant market share losses in these sectors; however this is not happening in the 
Doha cases. The competition from cheaper imports is also reflected – again only for the 
full liberalization case – in the decline of prices of domestic output.  
    38






































C e r e a l G r a i n s - 6 - 3 - 3411 - 211 6 8 1 4 1 3511 - 211
O i l S e e d s - 1 8 - 8 - 7511 - 600 6 098 2 033 - 311
R a w S u g a r 000 - 211 000 - 211
O t h e r C r o p s 2 312100 - 1116 - 3 - 3100 - 111
L i v e s t o c k - 411311 - 211 311 - 211
R a w A n i m a l P r o d u c t s 2 245211 - 21150 - 1211 - 211
O i l M i n e r a l s - 6011 - 1 - 1 - 501 2 621700 - 401
L i g h t M a n u f a c t u r i n g 4 80 - 3011 - 500 1 5 9 6 2 6 1533 - 401
A g r i I n d u s t r i e s E x p 5 921000 - 401 3 044311 - 411
WoodProductsPaper 23 4 4 -1 0 0 -4 0 1 11 -1 -1 0 0 0 -4 0 1
C h e m i c a l s O i l P r 1 853 - 2 - 10 - 4019 - 1 - 1 - 2 - 10 - 401
M e t a l M i n e r a l P r o d u c t s 2 4 3 2- 4- 1- 1- 5 0 11 5 0- 1- 2- 1- 1- 4 0 1
M a c h i n e r y E q u i p m e n t 4 2 5 3 - 1 2- 2- 1- 6 0 11 1- 1- 2 - 1 0- 1- 1- 5 0 1
O t h e r S e r v i c e s 100 - 401 100 - 401
C o n s t r u c t i o n - 1 423000 - 3018 - 1 - 1000 - 301
T r a d e C o m m u n i c a t i o n - 1 223000 - 3016 - 1 - 2000 - 301
P u b l i c S e r v i c e s - 1 323000 - 3017 - 1 - 2000 - 301
A g r i 6 - 2 - 1211 - 211 2 210311 - 211
N o n - A g r i 2 133 - 100 - 401 2 132000 - 401
E c o n o m y w i d e 2 133 - 100 - 401 2 132000 - 401
Domestic Output
Supply side Demand side
Import Volumes




Price of domestic 
output in dom mkts
Export Volumes
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
These demand/imports side effects are linked to the supply response to which we now 
turn. For producers of exportable goods, the reduction of prices in local markets (ΔPd) 
combined with unchanged or rising export prices creates incentives to increase the share 
of sales destined to foreign markets. This export response (shown in the columns “Export 
Volumes”) varies across sectors and it is linked to the pattern of Brazil’s comparative 
advantage and to the increase in international prices. Brazil’s comparative advantage can 
be ascertained by considering the export orientation (Exports / Dom Output) column in 
Table 8, which highlights three sectors in particular: Oilseeds, Other Crops, and the 
Agricultural transformation industry. These sectors – which also enjoy large jumps in 
their international price – experience export surges. Due to the generally positive export 
price shocks, other sectors join in an overall expansion of supply to foreign markets. 
Rising export sales more than offset, or at least compensate, reductions of domestic sales 
and lead to changes observed in the columns labeled “Domestic Output”. Finally output 
price changes (in the rightmost columns) are in between those of domestic prices and 
those of export prices for the simple reason that output prices are a combination (CET 
prices) of (generally) rising export prices and domestic prices.   39
As for the demand side, similar across-scenarios differences are observed for the supply 
side. In particular, given the closure rule for the foreign market, economy wide increases 
of import volumes are balanced by a comparable increase in exports.
33   
In summary, trade reforms promote a production structure specialized towards 
exportables, which in Brazil is translated in a specialization towards primary or 
agricultural transformation sectors. This agriculture export-led boom is fully achieved 
only in the full liberalization scenario, given its stronger price changes and the 
elimination of tariffs.
34 
The full liberalization and the two Doha scenarios entail trade policy reforms that 
combine, in different proportions, domestic tariff abatement with external price and 
quantity shocks. It has been shown that, in most situations, unilateral liberalization is 
beneficial; however it may be of interest, especially from a negotiation point of view, to 
decompose the total effect and ascertain the shares attributable to domestic liberalization 
and to external shocks. Given the interactions between Brazilian domestic policies and 
the Rest of the World (ROW) policies, a decomposition exercise is path dependent, 
therefore the shares attributed to one set of policy or the other will differ according to the 
choice in their sequencing. 
                                                 
33 Due to the closure rule of the external account, namely the fixing of foreign savings, and the full 
employment assumption, the slightly lower expansion of the volumes of exports, with respect to import 
volumes is compensated with a real exchange rate appreciation which originates from rising domestic 
resource costs. 
34 It should be stressed that in our model trade opening only produces allocative efficiency gains and not 
other, potentially much stronger, dynamic productivity gains.   40
Table 10: Effects on imports, exports and real GDP due to combined or partial shock (Indices, 



















Combined (Own + Rest of the World liberalization) shock --- BaU = 100
Agri 105.7 98.3 99.1 122.4 100.7 100.2 102.9 100.0 99.9
Non-Agri 121.3 103.3 102.7 121.0 102.7 102.0 100.1 100.0 100.0
Economywide 120.8 103.1 102.5 121.2 102.5 101.8 100.2 100.0 100.0
Own shock --- BaU = 100
Agri 107.3 98.9 99.8 114.5 100.8 100.2 102.0 100.2 100.0
Non-Agri 113.1 100.8 100.2 116.6 101.0 100.3 100.2 100.0 100.0
Economywide 112.9 100.8 100.2 116.4 101.0 100.3 100.3 100.0 100.0
Rest of the World shock --- BaU = 100
Agri 96.8 99.4 99.4 107.1 99.9 99.9 101.0 99.8 99.8
Non-Agri 107.5 102.4 102.4 104.2 101.7 101.7 99.9 100.0 100.0
Economywide 107.1 102.3 102.3 104.4 101.5 101.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
Demand side
Import Volumes Export Volumes Real GDP
Supply side "Welfare"
 
Note: For each variable, these indices are calculated as the ratio of the level in the trade 
scenarios to that of the BaU scenario for the last year (2015) and multiplied by 100. Source: 
Authors’ calculations.  
For three key variables, Table 10 shows the effects of the total and partial shocks as 
indices calculated on the levels reached in the final year, with the final year for the BaU 
equal to 100. In the case of the full liberalization scenario and across all variables, own 
liberalization accounts for a large share of the total shock. Imports in agriculture actually 
increase more in the partial own liberalization shock than in the combined shock, given 
that the external shock drives international agricultural prices up. The reduction of the 
mentioned anti-(agriculture-)export bias implicit in the initial protection, is also 
explaining the large share of export and real GDP effects accounted by the own 
liberalization shock.  
Decomposition results for the Doha scenarios are less clear cut. The magnitudes of the 
shocks are much smaller, however even the very low levels of domestic tariff abatement 
seem to matter for the final result. A relevant policy lesson emerges from the comparison 
of the two partial shocks panels of Table 10: a passive non reciprocating attitude may 
bring some advantages; however these are quite limited, even in the extreme case where 
every one in the world but Brazil implements full liberalization. In fact, these externally-
induced benefits may be greatly enhanced by an active domestic liberalization reform.  
For their poverty and income distribution implications, changes in factors’ markets are 
the most important aspect of the structural adjustment caused by trade reform. Changes in 
wages and sectoral employment are linked to changes of goods prices through the 
production technology and the functioning of the factor markets. Different production 
technologies are approximated by different factor’s intensities across sectors, as shown in 
Table 4, and labor markets function so as to mimic realistic adjustment possibilities:   41
skilled workers can freely move across all sectors, whereas unskilled ones face two 
segmented markets and can just imperfectly migrate from the agricultural to the non 
agricultural segment.  














ing Pop 2001-2015 2015
Millions %
Business as Usual:
Agri 0.02 1.68 1.66 -4.04 21.51
Non-Agri 2.20 0.91 0.53 4.04 78.49
Economywide 2.0 1.7 1.26
Full Liberalization:
Agri 0.18 2.10 1.51 -3.71 21.99
Non-Agri 2.15 1.07 0.49 3.71 78.01
Economywide 2.0 1.7 1.32
Deep Doha:
Agri 0.06 1.78 1.62 -3.96 21.64
Non-Agri 2.19 0.93 0.52 3.96 78.36
Economywide 2.0 1.7 1.27
Weak Doha:
Agri 0.06 1.77 1.62 -3.96 21.63
Non-Agri 2.19 0.93 0.52 3.96 78.37




Migration as % of:
Yearly %
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Table 11 highlights how trade shocks affect labor market structural adjustments. Due to 
its agriculture boom and its increased demand for “agricultural” factors of production, the 
full trade liberalization induces a significant increase in the wage rate for unskilled 
workers. When compared with the BaU, the yearly rate of growth of wage of unskilled 
workers in agriculture is 0.4 percentage points higher, and this higher rate accounts for a 
cumulative 14 year growth of 34% much higher than the cumulative growth of 26% in 
the BaU. Given this wage incentive, migration decreases and about 340 thousands 
workers who were moving out of agriculture in the BaU scenario do not switch activity in 
the full liberalization case. This has some effect on the aggregate distribution of unskilled 
workers between agriculture and non-agriculture, as shown in the last column of Table 
11.  
As far as the Doha scenarios are concerned, negligible effects are recorded for the 
employment structure and some weak wage increase is observed for unskilled in 
agriculture.    42
4.4  Distributional and Poverty Results of the Trade Scenarios 
Two fundamental results emerge from analyzing the micro impacts of the trade scenarios. 
Firstly, our initial hypothesis that trade liberalization, by working against the “natural” 
forces of structural change, might weaken long-term trends of poverty reduction has been 
discarded. Although less people migrate towards higher paid non-agricultural jobs, 
mainly through increased agricultural incomes, poverty is further reduced in the trade 
liberalization scenarios. However, and this is the second fundamental result, trade reform 
as envisaged in the current Doha scenarios – but even in the hypothetical full 
liberalization one – is not of great help in the fight against poverty and its complete 
eradication needs additional more targeted and possibly more costly interventions.  
These two sets of results are clearly illustrated by Table 12, which shows the poverty and 
distributional outcomes as percentage point differences between the trade scenarios and 
the BaU scenario for the final (2015) year: the full liberalization scenario leads to a 
further reduction in the headcount poverty index of 0.5 percentage points, whereas for 
deep Doha scenario the effects are almost negligible.
35 Similarly the Gini index is 
reduced by 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points in the full liberalization and deep Doha 
scenarios. 






Gini 58.5 -0.1 -0.2
P0 18.0 -0.2 -0.5
P1 6.6 -0.1 -0.2
P2 3.5 0.0 -0.1  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
As for the BaU scenario, a thorough assessment of the trade scenarios needs to go beyond 
these aggregate indicators and should rely on more disaggregate poverty and 
distributional analyses. In search of trade-induced poverty effects, the remaining part of 
this section considers an array of indicators, from growth incidence curves to poverty 
statistics estimated on specific sub samples. In particular poverty and distributional 
impacts are separately measured for the agricultural and non-agricultural groups, the 
movers and stayers, the rural and urban populations, the regional samples, and the 
                                                 
35 Given that the weak Doha scenario does not produce any visible results, in this section we just report 
results for the full liberalization and the deep Doha scenarios.   43
groupings obtained by educational attainment, by land ownership, and by occupational 
status. 
Figure 3 shows the growth incidence curves for the poorest thirty percent of all 
households under the three scenarios. The curve for the deep Doha scenario lies slightly 
above the BaU curve. The full liberalization reform also shifts the whole curve upwards, 
however this shift is larger than that of the Doha case, and it seems to favor the poorest 
among the poor; in other words, full liberalization appears to induce an additional pro-
poor distributional shift. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Table 13 shows the sectorally disaggregated results. Inequality for all households falls 
due to decreased inequality among agricultural households and lower inequality increase 
among non-agricultural households, although inequality between these two groups may 
have risen somewhat. Despite declining inequality and slightly higher per capita income 
growth, poverty reduction for agricultural households barely changes and this is due, as 
shown below, by the lower migration levels induced by the trade shocks. Indeed, in the 
deep Doha scenario the reduction in the population share of agricultural households is 
only very slightly below that achieved in the BaU. More remarkable is the additional 
poverty reduction for non-agricultural households that can largely be explained by the 
lower increase in inequality, as per capita income growth is only marginally higher.   44














% of  BaU 
change
PC income 314.9 1.5 101.5 351.9 1.3 102.1 148.3 2.4 101.3
Gini 58.6 -0.2 194.4 57.1 0.5 81.8 56.6 -0.8 111.5
P0 23.6 -5.8 103.4 18.6 -3.3 106.5 46.2 -14.0 101.5
P1 9.6 -3.1 102.7 7.1 -1.6 104.6 21.0 -8.2 102.1
P2 5.3 -1.9 102.5 3.7 -0.9 104.3 12.3 -5.3 102.0
Population % 100.0 81.8 3.2 98.3 18.2 -3.2 98.3
Contr. to P0 64.4 8.6 96.0 35.6 -8.6 96.0
All households Non-agricultural households Agricultural households
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Given its larger price and quantities shocks, the full liberalization scenario yields more 
significant poverty changes, as shown in Table 14. In contrast to the Doha scenario, 
agricultural households gain considerably from full liberalization and their headcount 
index is reduced by almost 1.5 percentage points. This sector specific income gains more 
than compensate the further (albeit small) reduction of agricultural out-migration.  
For non-agricultural households, the full liberalization scenario improves the income 
distribution, the Gini increases by only 72 per cent of the increase recorded in the BaU. 
Growth is only slightly higher for this group of households but, as shown above, minor 
distributional shifts accompanied by slightly higher growth can result in significant 
poverty reduction. 














% of  BaU 
change
PC income 314.9 1.6 106.4 351.9 1.3 106.8 148.3 2.6 109.8
Gini 58.6 -0.3 312.2 57.1 0.5 72.0 56.6 -0.9 117.0
P0 23.6 -6.1 109.2 18.6 -3.6 116.3 46.2 -14.9 108.0
P1 9.6 -3.2 108.2 7.1 -1.8 113.7 21.0 -8.6 107.4
P2 5.3 -1.9 107.8 3.7 -1.0 113.0 12.3 -5.6 107.2
Population % 100.0 81.8 3.1 93.0 18.2 -3.1 93.0
Contr. to P0 64.4 8.4 96.0 35.6 -7.6 96.0
All households Non-agricultural households Agricultural households
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Trade shocks simultaneously increase agricultural incomes and reduce inter-sectoral 
migration and how these two contrasting forces affect poverty outcome depends on the 
income levels (and therefore on the socio-economic characteristics) of those who decide 
to stay instead of moving. The next set of tables sheds some light on this issue.  
Table 15 shows the poverty levels and changes under the BaU and the trade scenarios for 
agricultural households who remained in agriculture. First consider the BaU case. Having 
identified those households that will not move, it is possible to calculate the headcount   45
for this group in the initial year (2001): their headcount is equal to 44.1% more than 2 
percentage points below the 46.2 level
36 calculated for all 2001 (stayer and potential 
mover) agricultural households. This lower level of poverty implies that moving 
households are on average poorer than those who remain in agriculture. Accordingly, the 
changes in P0 are 12.1 instead of 13.7 percentage points. In 2015, about 15 percent of the 
population still live in agricultural households.
37 The agricultural expansion following 
trade liberalization has only a minor effect on agricultural employment, by far not enough 
to offset the reduction in agricultural employment from the BaU. Accordingly, the change 
of the share of agricultural households due to trade liberalization is only minor, in 
particular for the Doha scenario. Yet, when translated in actual migrating individuals, this 
small share change means that almost four hundred thousand individuals – who would 
have become members of non-agricultural households in the BaU – in the full 
liberalization scenario remain in agricultural households. Despite the fact that these 
“potential mover households” are on average poorer than the typical “stayer household”, 
as we illustrate below, poverty among agricultural households decreases compared to the 
BaU. The poor stayers hence gain under both trade scenarios although this gain is almost 
negligible for the Doha scenario. 




Doha % of  
BaU 
change
Full % of  
BaU 
change
P0 44.1 -11.7 101.7 109.5
P1 20.0 -7.0 102.4 108.5
P2 11.7 -4.6 102.3 108.2
Population % 14.9 100.4 101.5
Households remaining in agri
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
As could be indirectly inferred from the analysis of the stayers, the group of the movers 
should experience the largest welfare gains. Indeed as illustrated in Table 16, in the BaU 
agricultural households who become non-agricultural households record a 22.4 
percentage points reduction in their headcount index, down from a considerably high, 
especially in comparison to the stayers group, initial level of 56.6 percent.  
                                                 
36 Shown in Table 5. 
37 The initial poverty levels among those who stay in agriculture under the trade scenarios are almost 
identical to the initial levels among the BaU stayers, so we decided not to report them. The same holds for 
the movers, for whom we report results later.   46
This outcome could not be derived straightforwardly from the estimation of the migration 
choice. In fact, the estimations showed that potential migrants were found to be poorer, in 
particular landless, heads, but also better educated, hence less poor, non-heads. The 
explicit quantitative measurements allowed by micro-simulation were needed to highlight 
the poverty reducing role of changes in the sectoral composition of employment. 
In the trade scenarios, a moderately additional poverty reduction is observed. This is due 
to the income increases trade reforms induce in the non-agriculture sectors, but also 
because the fewer households that still move out of agriculture under the trade scenarios 
are actually poorer. 




Doha % of  
BaU 
change
Full % of  
BaU 
change
P0 56.6 -22.4 105.1 108.2
P1 26.0 -14.0 102.0 105.4
P2 15.2 -9.4 101.7 105.1
Population % 3.1 98.0 92.5
Agri households who have become non-agri
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
One final category needs to be examined: the non-agricultural stayers. Representing 80 
percent of the population, this is a large group; however, given the negligible migration 
out of the non-agricultural sector observed in the data, this group is explicitly excluded 
from the migration choice. For these households, the full liberalization brings about an 
additional reduction in the headcount of 0.4 percentage points, and through its favorable 
impact on non-agricultural unskilled wages the Doha scenario, too, makes a small but 
noticeable difference. 




Doha % of  
BaU 
change
Full % of  
BaU 
change
P0 18.6 -3.8 104.0 110.7
P1 7.1 -1.8 103.3 109.8
P2 3.7 -1.0 103.2 109.5
Population % 82.4
Non-agri households before and after
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Up to this point, the disaggregated analysis of the poverty impacts has been based on 
sectoral affiliation and thus it has been possible to link it directly to the sectoral results 
generated by the CGE model. However, additional policy relevant criteria can be used to 
identify other groups of households and to evaluate their specific trade induced poverty 
effects. In particular, we conduct impact analyses for rural and urban areas, by regions, 
by land ownership, by educational level and by occupation. Obviously, all these criteria 
are somehow correlated to basic categories included in the CGE model, for example the 
educational level is linked to the skilled/unskilled factor types, or the region to the 
prevalence of agricultural employment, but strict correlation should not limit the micro 
analysis. Using the full household survey information provides maximum flexibility and 
allows extracting ex-post additional information. Instead of roughly inferring the poverty 
impact on certain groups from correlations between the rigidly CGE embedded categories 
and micro characteristics, the generated counterfactual income distributions contain all 
the information needed and hence directly provide a quantitative assessment of the 
poverty impact on specific groups. 




Doha % of  
BaU 
change






Doha % of  
BaU 
change
Full % of  
BaU 
change
P0 19.6 -4.0 103.8 112.2 44.4 -12.1 103.1 108.2
P1 7.6 -2.0 103.2 110.1 20.1 -7.1 102.5 108.2
P2 4.0 -1.2 103.0 109.5 11.7 -4.7 102.3 107.7
Population % 83.7 1.3 99.5 93.2 16.3 -1.3 99.5 93.2
Contr. to P0 69.4 3.9 96.6 35.5 30.6 -3.7 102.3 119.8
Urban Rural
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 18 shows the poverty impact of trade by urban or rural residence. Interestingly, the 
share of urban households in 2001 (83.7 percent) is even higher, although not much, than 
the share of non-agricultural households (81.8 percent). Quite some households live in 
urban areas, very likely in urban peripheries, and earn their living primarily from 
agricultural wage-employment. Actually, only 66 percent of the agricultural households 
live in rural areas, while 5 percent of the non-agricultural households live in rural areas. 
The micro-simulations that generate the results of Table 18 also take into account rural-
urban migration by assuming that households migrate to urban areas if all employed 
household members leave agriculture. In the BaU, this causes the rural population to 
decline by 1.3 percentage points. The urban population accounts for almost 70 percent of 
the Brazilian poor in 2001 and this share rises in the BaU by 3.9 percentage points. Urban 
poverty declines under both trade scenarios with the decline being stronger under the full   48
liberalization scenario. The Doha scenario hardly affects rural poverty, but full 
liberalization decreases the rural headcount by an additional percentage point. Some 
simple calculations can give some more meaning to these figures: The 0.5 percentage 
point difference in P0 in the full liberalization scenario means that approximately 
135,000 people are lifted out of poverty. The 1 percentage point difference implied by the 
full liberalization scenario reduces the number of poor people in rural areas by 
approximately 115,000. Considering the very small increase in non-agricultural unskilled 
wages this may be somewhat surprising, but it is the urban concentration that drives this 
result. Some more growth in urban areas lifts more people out of poverty than very high 
agricultural growth. 









Doha % of  
BaU P0 
change
Full % of  
BaU P0 
change
North 5.7 34.0 8.2 -7.9 101.0 107.7
Northeast 28.5 45.4 54.8 -9.3 102.6 109.5
Southeast 43.5 12.4 22.8 -3.7 101.9 107.9
South 15.2 14.7 9.5 -4.6 101.4 107.8
Center-West 7.1 16.0 4.8 -5.0 119.4 121.3
Region
2001 initial levels 2015
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Due to the regional differences both in factor endowments and specialization patterns, we 
might expect poverty reduction patterns to differ substantially between the regions for the 
BaU as well as for the trade shocks. The reduction in the headcount for the BaU confirms 
this expectation, as poverty declines more strongly in the Northeast, South, and Center-
West, the regions with the highest shares in agricultural employment. The Doha round 
has negligible effects across all regions although the figures in Table 19 suggest a 
different story for the Center-West. Yet, a look at the changes of P1 and P2 (not reported) 
demonstrates that this strong effect is due to many households being just below the 
poverty line in this region.
38 The Northeast, the region with the highest incidence of 
poverty where more than 50 percent of the Brazilian poor reside, benefits most from the 
Doha liberalization and about 50 000 individuals are lifted out of poverty in this region. 
In the same region, full liberalization helps about 175 000 individuals to escape poverty. 
The poor in the North, another region with worryingly high poverty rates, gain relatively 
                                                 
38 This is a case that illustrates why we usually report not only the headcount index, as this indicator can 
be quite misleading in some instances.   49
little from trade liberalization, whereas poverty in the South as well as in the Center-West 
decreases quite substantially due to the importance of agricultural income for the poor in 
these regions. 




Doha % of  
BaU 
change






Doha % of  
BaU 
change
Full % of  
BaU 
change
P0 37.1 -10.5 101.7 108.0 48.5 -12.5 101.9 110.6
P1 16.6 -6.2 102.7 109.1 22.2 -7.4 102.3 108.4
P2 9.5 -3.9 102.7 109.4 13.1 -5.0 102.2 107.8
Population % 38.4 61.6
Landowner households No land owning households
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 20 shows the poverty changes for landowners and agricultural households who do 
not own land separately. The landowning households account for approximately 40 
percent of the population in agricultural households. The differences between the two 
groups of agricultural households are quite striking. The poverty incidence among 
landowning households is much lower; the difference is more than 10 percentage points. 
Poverty decreases quite substantially for both groups in the BaU. Note that we only 
consider households who stay in agriculture. Poor households who do not own land 
benefit little from the Doha round, but full liberalization brings about an additional 
decrease of more than 1 percentage point in the headcount (affecting almost 100 000 
individuals). The reason why they benefit more from both trade scenarios is that they are 
more specialized in agricultural income. This is not necessarily what one would expect, 
but it may well be that owning land provides the resources to set up a small non-
agricultural business. Noteworthy is the finding that under both trade scenarios poverty 
gap as well as severity index decrease stronger than the headcount in terms of the BaU 
change. This again has to do with the specialization of households. The poorer 
landowning households derive a higher share of their income from agriculture whereas 
the richer households (at least among the poor) earn a higher share of income from non-
agricultural activities.    50











Doha % of  
BaU P0 
change
Full % of  
BaU P0 
change
<= 3 16.2 52.3 35.9 16.0 -10.7 103.5 111.5
<=5 16.9 36.0 25.7 16.6 -9.1 102.9 109.9
<=8 20.9 21.1 18.7 20.7 -5.6 105.0 111.5
<=10 12.9 11.3 6.2 12.9 -2.9 104.6 111.3
>=11 33.1 9.6 13.5 33.7 -2.0 101.7 104.6
Hh. average 
schooling
2001 initial levels 2015
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
As Table 21 indicates, the educational level of the households is an important 
determinant of poverty. The headcount among households with 3 or less average years of 
schooling of the employed household members is well above 50 percent. This group 
accounts for 16.2 percent of the population but for more than a third of the poor. The 
poverty incidence among households with 4 or 5 years of schooling is 15 percentage 
points lower. For both groups with ‘ten’ or ‘more than ten’ years of average schooling, 
the headcount is about 10 percent. The Doha round does not appear to be particularly 
helpful for those with little educational endowment. Yet, the full liberalization scenario 
again leads to a substantial additional reduction in poverty. 
Finally, we analyze the poverty impact of trade reform by occupational groups. In Table 
22 we differentiate between wage-employed, self-employed and households with 
members engaged in both types of employment in agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities, respectively.
39 In addition, there are households with no employed household 
member. One out of five poor people in Brazil comes from a self-employed agricultural 
household, and the agricultural wage-employed households are almost equally poor. In 
non-agricultural households, the difference between self-employed and wage-employed 
households in terms of poverty is not too pronounced. Due to their high share in the 
population, non-agricultural wage-employed households account for more than a third of 
the Brazilian poor. Poverty rates are significantly lower for households who derive their 
income from both wage-and self-employment. Under the Doha scenario, all non-
agricultural household groups gain, whereas there are only minor gains for agricultural 
households. As noted above, full liberalization however helps both agricultural and non-
agricultural households. Interestingly, poverty in non-agricultural activities declines more 
                                                 
39 If the number of self-employed household members is greater than the number of wage-employed 
members, the household is considered self-employed, and vice versa. Are the numbers equal, the 
households falls under the “both” category.   51
among the self-employed, whereas in agricultural activities the decline is stronger for the 
wage-employed. As in the case of households who do not own land, the agricultural 
wage-employed households derive more income from agricultural unskilled labor than 
agricultural self-employed households. For non-agricultural households, it is the greater 
importance of skilled income for the wage-employed that makes poverty decline less 
strongly for this group. 















 % of  BaU 
P0 change
Agri wage-empl. 5.6 46.2 11.0 -1.5 -14.3 -1.5 101.5 -1.4 111.2
Agri self-empl. 10.2 48.0 20.7 -1.3 -13.7 -1.3 101.4 -1.2 106.7
Agri both 2.4 38.8 3.9 -0.5 -14.1 -0.5 101.3 -0.5 105.5
Not empl. 7.8 27.4 9.1 0.0 -4.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Non-agri wage 48.5 17.2 35.3 1.6 -3.1 1.6 107.2 1.5 117.4
Non-agri self 15.9 22.7 15.3 1.1 -2.9 1.1 107.9 1.1 121.0
Non-agri both 9.6 11.5 4.7 0.6 -2.3 0.6 108.0 0.5 123.4
2001 initial levels BaU 2001-15 Doha 2001-15 Full 2001-15
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
To sum up, the poverty changes under the deep Doha scenario are rather moderate and 
disappointing. With one exception, our analyses do not detect a particularly favorable 
effect on any of the poor and vulnerable groups that we have identified. This one 
exception is that the Doha scenario very slightly appears to favor the Northeast. Overall, 
income growth under the Doha scenario favors non-agricultural activities and, 
accordingly, urban areas. Since the population is concentrated in urban areas, some 
growth can already reduce poverty considerably, in particular if accompanied by a pro-
poor distributional shift, as in the Doha scenario. Our analyses show that anti-poor 
changes in the distribution can easily dwarf the poverty reducing potential of growth. The 
income growth pattern under full liberalization tends to favor poor groups. Poor 
agricultural and less educated households benefit considerably more from full 
liberalization than from the Doha liberalizations. 
5  Conclusions 
Our analysis is centered on the contributions to poverty reduction of one key long-term 
trend observed in the labor markets of many developing countries: the movement of 
workers out of agriculture and the consequent increase of the employment shares of the 
non-farm sectors of the economy. Econometric estimates for Brazil show that, with few   52
exceptions, poorer individuals are more likely to migrate to non-farm occupations – 
which on average offer much higher earnings than farm ones – and thus provide direct 
evidence that finding a job in the non-farm segment is a main road out of poverty. The 
data also highlight some of the major factors that increase individuals’ likelihood of 
moving and knowledge of these factors may offer some preliminary guidance for policy 
interventions aimed at reducing poverty. In particular, imperfections in the capital 
markets (especially in the land market) and low education seem to act as traps and reduce 
the probability of migrating.  
By embedding these ex-post estimations in an income generation microsimulation model 
and by linking the latter to a computable general equilibrium model, we are also able to 
produce some interesting ex-ante policy scenario analysis. The focus is on trade policy, 
but the methodology developed here may be applied to evaluate other policy reforms. In 
our simulation setting we ‘test’ and reject the hypothesis that trade liberalization, by 
reducing labor migration out of agriculture, might weaken long-term trends of poverty 
reduction. In the trade reforms scenarios, as those envisaged in the current Doha 
negotiations as well as in the hypothetical full liberalization one, a larger number of 
workers remain in agriculture compared to Business as Usual scenario. However, as the 
trade-related gains in agricultural incomes more than compensates for the reduced 
benefits of lower migration flows, more people are able to escape poverty. The positive 
impact of liberalization is not limited to rural areas and agricultural activities. The urban 
poor gain from higher incomes for unskilled labor, even in non-agricultural sectors, and 
from the related pro-poor shift in the urban income distribution. In addition, the urban 
poor benefit indirectly from the gains in agriculture and the connected lower migration 
towards non farm activities, as downward the pressure on the wages of non-agricultural 
unskilled workers is relieved somewhat. Trade reforms add very little to the BaU’s 6 
percentage point reduction of poverty incidence, from 23% in 2001 to 17% in 2015. Full 
liberalization cumulative final effect is just an additional reduction of half a percentage 
point and the most generous Doha deal is half of the full liberalization effect. Trade 
reform, and in particular domestic trade reforms, may particularly help the Brazilian poor 
farmers, but only broad-based high growth, and possibly additional more targeted and 
more costly pro-poor interventions, will eradicate urban poverty.  
An important limitation of our analysis is that we do not assume any dynamic gains from 
trade liberalization. Our results might hence be taken as a lower bound of the welfare 
effects, as there is strong evidence of a beneficial impact of trade liberalization on 
productivity (Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004). We also acknowledge that our 
representation of urban labor markets may be too simple to evaluate the effects of trade   53
reform on the poorest groups in urban areas, who are largely engaged in the informal 
sector. Unfortunately, given the paucity of hard data on the size and behavior of the 
informal economy, our model does not explicitly account for it. This may be a serious 
limitation especially with regard to the analysis of trade shocks. In fact, due to their 
dissimilar technologies and trade-orientation, informal and formal activities may be 
affected in very different ways by trade reforms. Similarly, the exogenous human capital 
upgrading implemented in our model is a rather strong simplification of the complex 
endogenous education decision process happening in reality, so some of its more subtle 
income distribution effects may be lost. 
Notwithstanding these limitations and although more data and computation intensive, the 
macro-micro modeling approach developed for this study has many advantages over 
simpler more aggregate methods. In particular, our framework can be used to do 
decomposition analyses and assess the relative importance of changes of per capita 
average incomes versus changes in inequality. In other words, we can identify and 
measure more precisely how policy shocks are transmitted to the various households and 
how households’ specific socio-economic characteristics affect the final poverty 
outcomes. For Brazil, the majority of the BaU’s decline of poverty is due to poverty 
reduction in agriculture and this is attributable to factor price changes (higher wages). 
Additional portions of poverty reduction are due to the exit of labor from agriculture 
(especially important for the poorer among the poor), and finally to skill upgrading.  
Having at our disposal counterfactual income distributions that contain all the relevant 
information on socio-economic characteristics, our post-simulation analyses can provide 
quantitative assessment of the poverty impact on many specific groups, without the 
limitations of the initial, often fairly limited, groups of household included in the CGE 
model.  
 
6  Bibliography 
Armington, P.S. (1969). A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of 
Production. IMF Staff Papers 16: 159-178. 
Barrett, C.B. (2004). Rural Poverty Dynamics: Development Policy Implications. Paper 
prepared for invited presentation at the 25
th International Conference of 
Agricultural Economists, Durban, South Africa. 
Bourguignon, F. (2003). The Growth Elasticity of Poverty Reduction: Explaining 
Heterogeneity across Countries and Time Periods, in: T. Eicher and S.   54
Turnovsky, eds. Inequality and growth. Theory and Policy Implications. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Bourguignon, F., F.H.G. Ferreira, P.G. Leite (2002). Ex-ante Evaluation of Conditional 
Cash Transfer Programs: The Case of Bolsa Escola. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2916. 
F. Bourguignon, F.H.G. Ferreira, N. Lustig (2005). A Synthesis of the Results. In: F. 
Bourguignon, F.H.G. Ferreira, N. Lustig, eds. (2005). The Microeconomics of 
Income Distribution Dynamics. World Bank and Oxford University Press. 
Bussolo, M., J. Lay (2003). Globalization and Poverty Changes: A Case Study on 
Colombia. Working Paper No. 226, OECD Development Centre, Paris. 
Dias, G.L.S., C.M. Amaral (2002). Structural Change in Brazilian Agriculture, 1980-98. 
In: Baumann, R. (2002). Brazil in the 1990s – An Economy in Transition. 
Palgrave. 
Elbers, C., J.O. Lanjouw, P. Lanjouw, P.G. Leite (2004). Poverty and Inequality in 
Brazil: New Estimates from Combined PPV-PNAD Data. The Word Bank. 
Mimeo. Draft April 2004. 
Ferreira, H.G., P. Lanjouw, M. Neri (2001). A Robust Poverty Profile for Brazil Using 
Multiple Data Sources. Paper Presented at the LACEA 2000 and ANPEC 2001 
meetings. 
Ferreira, H.G.F., R. Paes de Barros (2005). The Slippery Slope: Explaining the Increase 
in Extreme Poverty in Urban Brazil, 1976-96. In: F. Bourguignon, F.H.G. 
Ferreira, N. Lustig, eds. (2005). The Microeconomics of Income Distribution 
Dynamics. World Bank and Oxford University Press. 
Fiess, N.M., D. Verner (2003). Migration and Human Capital in Brazil During the 
1990s. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3093. 
Golan, A., G. Judge, D. Miller (1996). Maximum Entropy Econometrics. Robust 
Estimation with Limited Data. John Wiley and Sons. 
Harrison, G.W., T.F. Rutherford, D. Tarr, and A. Gurgel (2003). Regional, Multilateral, 
and Unilateral Trade Policies of MERCOSUR for Growth and Poverty Reduction 
in Brazil. World Bank Working Paper 3051. 
Helfand, S.M. and G.C. De Rezende (2004). The Impact of Sector-Specific and 
Ecoonomy-Wide Reforms on the Agricultural Sector in Brazil: 1980-98. 
Contemporary Economic Policy 22 (2). 
IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) (1997). Anuário Estatístico do 
Brasil 57. 
Johnston, J., J. Di Nardo (1997). Econometric Methods. 4
th ed., McGraw-Hill. 
Kappel, R., J. Lay, S. Steiner (2005), Uganda: No More Pro-Poor Growth? Development 
Policy Review, 23 (1). 
Long J.S., J. Freese (2001). Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables 
Using STATA. STATA Press.   55
Martin, W., D. Mitra (1999). Productivity Growth and Convergence in Agriculture and 
Manufacturing. World Bank Policy Research Paper 2171. 
Nakosteen, R.A., M. Zimmer (1980). Migration and Income: The Question of Self 
Selection. Southern Economic Journal 46 (3). 
Paes de Barros, R. (2004). Pobreza Rural e Trabalho Agrícola no Brasil ao Longo da 
Década de Noventa. Mimeo. 
Ravallion, M, S. Chen (2003). Measuring pro-poor growth. Economics Letters 78 (1). 
Ravallion, M. (2001) ‘Growth, inequality, and poverty: Looking beyond averages’, 
World Development 29 (11): 1803-15. 
Ravallion, M. and Datt, G. (1999) When is growth pro-poor? Evidence from the diverse 
experiences of India’s states. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2263. 
Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Robilliard, A.-S., F. Bourguignon, S. Robinson (2002). Examining the Social Impact of 
the Indonesian Financial Crisis Using a Micro-Macro Model. mimeo. 
Robilliard, A.-S., S. Robinson (1999), Reconciling Household Surveys and National 
Accounts Data Using a Cross Entropy Estimation Method. TMD Discussion 
Paper No. 50, IFPRI. 
Spatz, J. (2004). The Impact of Structural Reforms on Wages and Employment: The Case 
of Formal versus Informal Workers in Urban Bolivia. Latin American Journal of 
Economic Development / Revista Latino Americana de Desarrollo Económico 
1(2) 
Taubman, P. and M. Wachter (1986). Segmented Labor Markets. In: Ashenfelter, O. and 
R. Layard eds. (1986). Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. II, Elsevier Science 
Publishers. 
Verner, D. (2004). Making the Poor Count Takes More Than Counting the Poor – A 
Quick Poverty Assessment of the State of Bahia, Brazil. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3216. 
Winters, L. A., N. McCulloch, A. McKay (2004). Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The 
Evidence So Far. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 152, pp. 72-115. 
World Bank (2003). Brazil – Inequality and Economic Development. Volume 1; Policy 
Report. Report No. 24487-BR. 
World Bank (2001). World Development Report (WDR) 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. 
Washington, DC: Oxford University Press.   56
7  Appendices  
7.1  Estimation results, mover-stayer model 
Mover-stayer model for heads, Logit estimates
Number of obs = 6726868.000
Wald chi2(6) = 197.120
Prob > chi2 = 0.000




dedu 0.419 0.278 1.510 0.132 -0.126 0.963
age -0.044 0.005 -9.490 0.000 -0.053 -0.035
ddworkown -1.123 0.319 -3.520 0.000 -1.749 -0.497
dcess -0.825 0.327 -2.530 0.012 -1.466 -0.185
dprop -0.736 0.172 -4.280 0.000 -1.074 -0.399
dgregio1 0.593 0.202 2.930 0.003 0.196 0.990
_cons -1.708 0.178 -9.580 0.000 -2.058 -1.359









Log pseudo-likelihood = -655384.78
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: 
dedu:    educational dummy for 10 or more years of schooling 
ddworkown:  dummy for own-consumption workers 
dcess:    holding ceded land 
dprop:    holding own land 
dgregio1:   north.   57
Mover-stayer model for non-heads, Logit estimates
Number of obs = 8166562
Wald chi2(6) = 293.58
Prob > chi2 = 0.000




dprim3 0.782 0.229 3.410 0.001 0.332 1.232
dsec1 0.633 0.298 2.120 0.034 0.049 1.218
dsec2 0.597 0.324 1.840 0.066 -0.039 1.232
exp 0.101 0.023 4.340 0.000 0.055 0.146
exp2 -0.002 0.000 -4.270 0.000 -0.003 -0.001
gend -0.759 0.188 -4.030 0.000 -1.127 -0.390
preta -0.500 0.336 -1.490 0.137 -1.159 0.159
ddnonrem -0.849 0.171 -4.960 0.000 -1.185 -0.513
ddworkown -1.731 0.307 -5.640 0.000 -2.332 -1.130
dprop -1.839 0.462 -3.980 0.000 -2.745 -0.934
headnagr 1.122 0.167 6.710 0.000 0.794 1.450
headmover 2.468 0.374 6.610 0.000 1.736 3.200
_cons -4.369 0.298 -14.640 0.000 -4.954 -3.783















Log pseudo-likelihood = -639678.55
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: 
dprim3:    9 years of schooling 
dsec1:    11 or 11 years of schooling 
dsec2:    12 years of schooling 
exp:   age  minus  schooling 
exp2:   experience  squared 
gend:   female  1 
preta:   black 
ddnonrem:   non-remunerated household member 
ddworkown: own-consumption  worker 
dprop:    holding own land 
headnagr    household head in non-agricultural sector 
headmover:  head has moved out of agriculture.   58
7.2  Estimation results, wage/profit equations 
Note on the selectivity bias of the wage/profit equations 
Some words on the choice of this specification are in order, as estimating the two wage 
equations for unskilled labor using OLS may appear problematic to the reader who is 
familiar with the concept of selectivity bias and is aware of the available econometric 
methods to deal with it. The reason for estimating two wage equations is based on the 
assumption that the wage-setting process in agriculture is different from the one in non-
agricultural sectors; and the results of our regressions confirm this assumption. When 
estimating two separate equations we therefore might have to account for selectivity bias. 
Selectivity bias refers to a bias in the coefficients of the wage equations which arises as 
the coefficients do not merely reflect the returns to education, seniority, or the influence 
of the included dummies, but also the returns of being employed in (or selected into) the 
respective sector. For example, having a high level of education affects the sectoral 
choice, i.e. the earnings indirectly, as well as the earnings directly. Applying OLS to the 
estimation of two separate (sectoral) wage equations would result in coefficients that 
reflect both the indirect (selection) and the direct effects. Selection can also be interpreted 
in terms of having a kind of “comparative advantage” in the chosen sector, which is not 
explicitly accounted for but represented by the biased OLS coefficients. Econometricians 
often describe the concept of selectivity by noting that the selection into the respective 
sectors is non-random. It has become very common to correct for selectivity bias using 
the so-called Heckman correction or one of its many variants. 
Many authors have warned against the indiscriminate use of the selectivity correction 
methods.
40 In line with this general skepticism, for reasons that have to do with the 
purpose of estimating the above equation, and due to practical estimation problems, we 
believe that correcting for selectivity bias is not necessary or may even lead to wrong 
results in the present context. The purpose of estimating the wage equations is to impute 
earnings for those who move between sectors. If we estimate the wage equation using 
OLS we implicitly assume that the returns to education and other characteristics of the 
individual include the indirect returns due to selection. We believe that this can be 
reasonably assumed, as an individual, for whom a wage is to be imputed, is actually 
selected into the corresponding sector.
41 In addition, estimating a selection model 
rendered inconsistent results. The only feasible estimation strategy would then have been 
to reduce the number of explanatory variables in the wage equation to include only one 
educational dummy for tertiary education with the remaining educational dummies to be 
only included in the selection equation.
42 This of course would have been highly 
unsatisfactory in terms of explaining the variation in earnings. These results are mainly 
owed to a combination of the following two factors. First, lower levels of education are 
highly significant in selecting an individual into agriculture. Second, there is little 
                                                 
40 See Johnston, Di Nardo (1997, pp.449-450) for a short overview of the major problems involved and 
the citations there. 
41 This assumption implies that there are no differences between individuals in terms of sectoral 
comparative advantages. If we estimated the wage equation correcting for selectivity, these differences 
would be reflected in the individual inverse Mills ratios. 
42 These or similar problems of applications of the Heckman procedure are often noted in applied work. 
A case in point is Spatz (2004).   59
variation in these variables for those in non-agricultural sectors. In light of these 





Wage/profit equation for agriculture unskilled
Number of obs = 11093822
F( 11,  3209) = 419.53
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.3021




edu 0.084 0.003 27.270 0.000 0.078 0.090
exp 0.047 0.002 29.900 0.000 0.044 0.050
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -28.780 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
gend -0.858 0.018 -46.640 0.000 -0.894 -0.822
preta -0.138 0.027 -5.050 0.000 -0.191 -0.084
parda -0.171 0.016 -10.490 0.000 -0.203 -0.139
nnonrem 0.043 0.009 4.790 0.000 0.025 0.060
drn -0.129 0.049 -2.620 0.009 -0.225 -0.032
drne -0.339 0.025 -13.590 0.000 -0.388 -0.290
drs 0.150 0.032 4.720 0.000 0.088 0.213
drcw 0.225 0.036 6.210 0.000 0.154 0.297




Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: 
edu:    years of schooling 
exp:   age  minus  schooling 
exp2:   experience  squared 
gend:   female  1 
preta:   black 
parda:   mixed  black 
nnonrem:    number of non-remunerated household members 
d*:    regional dummies with r for rural, n north, ne northeast, s south, cw center-west.   60
Wage/profit equation for non-agriculture unskilled
Number of obs = 42813743
F( 16,  6514) = 1710.86
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.423




edu 0.008 0.003 2.840 0.004 0.003 0.014
edu2 0.006 0.000 33.350 0.000 0.006 0.007
exp 0.069 0.001 88.200 0.000 0.068 0.071
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -68.950 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
gend -0.590 0.006 -102.830 0.000 -0.601 -0.579
preta -0.148 0.011 -13.460 0.000 -0.169 -0.126
parda -0.143 0.007 -21.910 0.000 -0.156 -0.130
dun -0.190 0.013 -15.020 0.000 -0.214 -0.165
drn -0.501 0.106 -4.710 0.000 -0.709 -0.293
dune -0.450 0.011 -40.590 0.000 -0.472 -0.428
drne -0.710 0.033 -21.800 0.000 -0.774 -0.646
drse -0.229 0.029 -7.960 0.000 -0.286 -0.173
dus -0.069 0.011 -6.470 0.000 -0.090 -0.048
drs -0.171 0.029 -5.950 0.000 -0.227 -0.115
ducw -0.123 0.013 -9.420 0.000 -0.149 -0.098
drcw -0.383 0.054 -7.040 0.000 -0.490 -0.276




Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: 
edu:    years of schooling 
edu2:   edu  squared 
exp:   age  minus  schooling 
exp2:   experience  squared 
gend:   female  1 
preta:   black 
parda:   mixed  black 
nnonrem:    number of non-remunerated household members 
d*:    regional dummies with r (u) for rural (urban), n north, ne northeast, s south, cw center-
west.   61
Wage/profit equation for skilled
Number of obs = 15960009
F( 16,  6514) = 995.20
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.453




edu -0.060 0.007 -9.140 0.000 -0.073 -0.047
edu2 0.009 0.000 30.520 0.000 0.009 0.010
exp 0.063 0.002 39.830 0.000 0.060 0.066
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -22.990 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
gend -0.515 0.009 -55.410 0.000 -0.533 -0.497
preta -0.277 0.024 -11.570 0.000 -0.324 -0.230
parda -0.214 0.011 -18.600 0.000 -0.236 -0.191
dun -0.153 0.023 -6.760 0.000 -0.198 -0.109
drn -0.520 0.099 -5.260 0.000 -0.714 -0.326
dune -0.408 0.018 -22.390 0.000 -0.443 -0.372
drne -0.796 0.044 -18.130 0.000 -0.882 -0.710
drse -0.276 0.055 -5.030 0.000 -0.384 -0.169
dus -0.146 0.017 -8.600 0.000 -0.179 -0.113
drs -0.317 0.052 -6.030 0.000 -0.419 -0.214
ducw -0.122 0.023 -5.210 0.000 -0.168 -0.076
drcw -0.108 0.098 -1.100 0.270 -0.301 0.084




Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: 
edu:    years of schooling 
edu2:   edu  squared 
exp:   age  minus  schooling 
exp2:   experience  squared 
gend:   female  1 
preta:   black 
parda:   mixed  black 
nnonrem:    number of non-remunerated household members 
d*:    regional dummies with r (u) for rural (urban), n north, ne northeast, s south, cw center-
west.   62
7.3  Estimation results, labor market segmentation 
Wage equation for testing segmentation hypothesis (unskilled)
Number of obs = 53279177
F( 47,  7228) = 1232.3
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.5021




dprim1 0.194 0.007 26.410 0.000 0.179 0.208
dprim2 0.343 0.008 41.420 0.000 0.327 0.359
dprim3 0.540 0.010 55.020 0.000 0.521 0.560
dsec1 0.637 0.012 53.890 0.000 0.613 0.660
dsec2 0.878 0.011 81.940 0.000 0.857 0.899
dter 1.464 0.019 78.220 0.000 1.428 1.501
exp 0.058 0.001 83.820 0.000 0.056 0.059
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -69.420 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
d1 -0.469 0.028 -16.510 0.000 -0.524 -0.413
d2 0.063 0.056 1.140 0.256 -0.046 0.172
d3 -0.011 0.024 -0.470 0.640 -0.059 0.036
d4 -0.238 0.017 -13.710 0.000 -0.272 -0.204
d5 -0.070 0.017 -4.030 0.000 -0.104 -0.036
d6 -0.722 0.028 -26.200 0.000 -0.776 -0.668
d7 0.226 0.049 4.610 0.000 0.130 0.322
d8 -0.033 0.012 -2.700 0.007 -0.058 -0.009
d9 0.024 0.016 1.530 0.126 -0.007 0.055
d10 0.020 0.023 0.890 0.374 -0.024 0.065
d11 0.124 0.019 6.520 0.000 0.087 0.162
d12 0.049 0.013 3.880 0.000 0.024 0.074
d13 0.135 0.015 9.230 0.000 0.106 0.164
d15 0.077 0.009 8.540 0.000 0.059 0.094
d16 0.093 0.007 13.020 0.000 0.079 0.107
d17 0.208 0.012 18.080 0.000 0.186 0.231
carteira 0.330 0.006 57.810 0.000 0.318 0.341
seasonal -0.125 0.017 -7.260 0.000 -0.158 -0.091
dse 0.088 0.009 9.660 0.000 0.070 0.106
arrend 0.116 0.043 2.720 0.007 0.032 0.200
poss -0.148 0.055 -2.720 0.007 -0.255 -0.041
cess -0.278 0.041 -6.760 0.000 -0.359 -0.198
prop 0.077 0.023 3.350 0.001 0.032 0.122
dworkown -0.138 0.021 -6.670 0.000 -0.179 -0.097
nnonrem 0.037 0.007 5.570 0.000 0.024 0.050
gend -0.531 0.006 -89.070 0.000 -0.542 -0.519
preta -0.144 0.010 -14.800 0.000 -0.163 -0.125
amarela 0.310 0.054 5.740 0.000 0.204 0.415
parda -0.135 0.006 -22.770 0.000 -0.147 -0.124
dun -0.144 0.012 -12.120 0.000 -0.167 -0.120
drn -0.312 0.044 -7.010 0.000 -0.399 -0.225
dune -0.422 0.010 -40.210 0.000 -0.443 -0.401
drne -0.573 0.020 -29.350 0.000 -0.611 -0.534
drse -0.223 0.021 -10.730 0.000 -0.264 -0.182
dus -0.081 0.010 -7.960 0.000 -0.101 -0.061
drs -0.142 0.024 -6.000 0.000 -0.188 -0.095
ducw -0.081 0.013 -6.460 0.000 -0.105 -0.056
drcw -0.141 0.026 -5.350 0.000 -0.193 -0.089
isourban2 -0.081 0.049 -1.660 0.098 -0.178 0.015
_cons 4.461 0.017 269.920 0.000 4.429 4.493
[95% Conf. Interval]
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Wage equation for testing segmentation hypothesis (skilled)
Number of obs = 16669698
F( 47,  7228) = 357.69
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.4503




dprim1 0.200 0.040 5.050 0.000 0.122 0.277
dprim2 0.239 0.038 6.290 0.000 0.165 0.314
dprim3 0.425 0.037 11.490 0.000 0.352 0.497
dsec1 0.490 0.037 13.140 0.000 0.417 0.563
dsec2 0.766 0.035 22.190 0.000 0.698 0.834
dter 1.484 0.036 41.620 0.000 1.414 1.554
exp 0.067 0.002 43.160 0.000 0.064 0.070
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -26.140 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
d1 -0.417 0.152 -2.740 0.006 -0.714 -0.119
d2 0.499 0.176 2.840 0.005 0.154 0.843
d3 0.216 0.211 1.020 0.306 -0.198 0.630
d4 -0.319 0.065 -4.870 0.000 -0.447 -0.190
d5 0.035 0.052 0.690 0.493 -0.066 0.136
d6 -0.048 0.183 -0.260 0.792 -0.407 0.311
d7 0.345 0.073 4.720 0.000 0.202 0.489
d8 0.195 0.033 5.970 0.000 0.131 0.259
d9 0.133 0.037 3.630 0.000 0.061 0.205
d10 0.214 0.035 6.140 0.000 0.146 0.282
d11 0.280 0.036 7.670 0.000 0.208 0.351
d12 0.135 0.034 3.940 0.000 0.068 0.203
d13 0.066 0.034 1.980 0.048 0.001 0.132
d15 0.264 0.031 8.630 0.000 0.204 0.324
d16 0.185 0.015 12.670 0.000 0.157 0.214
d17 0.110 0.015 7.260 0.000 0.081 0.140
carteira -0.059 0.012 -4.940 0.000 -0.083 -0.036
seasonal -0.705 0.213 -3.320 0.001 -1.122 -0.289
dse -0.254 0.025 -10.000 0.000 -0.304 -0.204
arrend 0.627 0.191 3.280 0.001 0.252 1.002
poss -0.085 0.341 -0.250 0.802 -0.754 0.583
cess -0.014 0.230 -0.060 0.952 -0.465 0.437
prop 0.391 0.062 6.350 0.000 0.270 0.512
nnonrem 0.039 0.017 2.340 0.019 0.006 0.072
gend -0.473 0.009 -50.400 0.000 -0.492 -0.455
preta -0.257 0.024 -10.910 0.000 -0.303 -0.211
amarela 0.255 0.069 3.680 0.000 0.120 0.391
parda -0.209 0.011 -18.640 0.000 -0.231 -0.187
dun -0.168 0.022 -7.470 0.000 -0.212 -0.124
drn -0.635 0.102 -6.230 0.000 -0.835 -0.436
dune -0.396 0.018 -21.520 0.000 -0.432 -0.360
drne -0.784 0.040 -19.360 0.000 -0.863 -0.704
drse -0.368 0.055 -6.730 0.000 -0.475 -0.261
dus -0.161 0.017 -9.470 0.000 -0.194 -0.127
drs -0.414 0.055 -7.580 0.000 -0.521 -0.307
ducw -0.153 0.023 -6.510 0.000 -0.199 -0.107
drcw -0.224 0.096 -2.330 0.020 -0.413 -0.035
isourban2 -0.028 0.078 -0.360 0.723 -0.180 0.125




Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: The grey-shaded dummies are dummies for agricultural sectors.   64
7.4  Poverty lines, in 2001 R$ 








Urban Rio de Janeiro 80
Rural Rio de Janeiro 72
Urban Sao Paulo 84
Rural Sao Paulo 69
Urban Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo 66









Source: Authors’ calculations based on Paes de Barros (2004). 
7.5  Macro model’ Sectors  
Table 24: Model-GTAP sector mapping 
Model Sectors GTAP 5 Sectors
1C e r e a l G r a i n s P D R W H T G R O
2 OilSeeds OSD
3R a w S u g a r C _ B
4 OthCrops V_F PFB OCR WOL FRS FSH
5 Livestock CTL
6 RawAnimalProducts OAP RMK
7 OilMinerals COL OIL GAS OMN
8 LightManufacturing CMT MIL PCR TEX WAP
9 AgriIndustriesExp OMT VOL SGR OFD LEA B_T
10 WoodProductsPaper LUM PPP
11 ChemicalsOilPr P_C CRP
12 MetalMineralProducts NMM I_S NFM FMP
13 MachineryEquipment MVH ELE OME OTN OMF
14 OtherServices GDT WTR ELY OFI ISR OBS ROS DWE
15 Construction CNS
16 TradeCommunication TRD CMN OTP WTP ATP
17 PublicServices OSG    65
Table 25: GTAP sector labels 
PDR Paddy rice LUM Wood products
WHT Wheat PPP Paper products, publishing
GRO Cereal grains nec P_C Petroleum, coal products
V_F Vegetables, fruit, nuts CRP Chemical, rubber, plastic products
OSD Oil seeds NMM Mineral products nec
C_B Sugar cane, sugar beet I_S Ferrous metals
PFB Plant-based fibers NFM Metals nec
OCR Crops nec FMP Metal products
CTL Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses MVH Motor vehicles and parts
OAP Animal products nec OTN Transport equipment nec
RMK Raw milk ELE Electronic equipment
WOL Wool, silk-worm cocoons OME Machinery and equipment nec
FOR Forestry OMF Manufactures nec
FSH Fishing ELY Electricity
COL Coal GDT Gas manufacture, distribution
OIL Oil WTR Water
GAS Gas CNS Construction
OMN Minerals nec TRD Trade
CMT Bovine meat products OTP Transport nec
OMT Meat products nec WTP Water transport
VOL Vegetable oils and fats ATP Air transport
MIL Dairy products CMN Communication
PCR Processed rice OFI Financial services nec
SGR Sugar ISR Insurance
OFD Food products nec OBS Business services nec
B_T Beverages and tobacco products ROS Recreational and other services
TEX Textiles OSG Public Administration, Defense, Education, Health
WAP Wearing apparel DWE Dwellings
LEA Leather products
GTAP 5 Sectors
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